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LAWYERING THAT HAS No NAME:
TITLE VI AND THE MEANING OF
PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT
Olatunde C.A. Johnson*
On the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
this Essay examines the problem ofprivate enforcement of Title VI. The Essay re-
views the unduly constrained approach to private enforcement taken by courts in
prominent decisions such as Regents of the University of California v. Bakke and
Alexander v. Sandoval. Yet the Essay argues that to focus primarily on private
court enforcement of Title VI will continue to relegate the provision to the mar-
gins of civil rights discourse, to make the provision appear largely as the "sleep-
ing giant" of civil rights law. The practice of Title VI lawyering entails not just ef-
forts to seek compliance in courts, but oversight, implementation, expansion, and
elaboration of the provision in agencies and policy contexts, through which Title
VI gains meaning and helps transform institutional practices.
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INTRODUCTION
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 might just be the most powerful
civil rights statute. The provision prohibits discrimination in federal, state, lo-
cal, and private programs that receive federal financial assistance.' It extends
across various types of practices and domains, addressing discrimination in a
range of areas including education, housing, employment, health care, transpor-
tation, agricultural programs, and the environment. Yet "sleeping giant" is the
term often invoked to describe Title VI.2 Each anniversary of Title VI provokes
concem that the full power of the statute has gone untapped.3 Federal agency
officials charged with administrative enforcement of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 announce new efforts to unleash the power of Title VI.4 Nongovernmen-
tal actors, litigants, and advocates plot strategies to enhance private enforce-
ment and implementation of the provision.5 Yet to the general public and even
to most lawyers, Title VI is largely unknown. Title VI is not a prominent fea-
ture of academic commentary on civil rights law and is often absent from civil
rights casebooks. When Title VI was already three decades old, a prominent
civil rights lawyer urged more use of the statute, deeming Title VI "powerful,
but largely unused." 6
1. Civil Rights Act of 1964, tit. VI, § 601, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2012) ("No person in
the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any pro-
gram or activity receiving Federal financial assistance."). As a result of 1988 amendments to
the Act, "program or activity" is defined broadly to include "all of the operations" of state or
local governments "any part of which is extended Federal financial assistance." Civil Rights
Restoration Act of 1987 § 6, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-4a. Federal regulations make clear that
"[f]ederal financial assistance" includes grants, loans of funds, donations or grants of federal
property, and the detail of federal personnel. See 28 C.F.R. § 42.102(c) (2013).
2. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PROTECTING AGAINST RACE, COLOR, AND
NATIONAL ORIGIN DISCRIMINATION BY RECIPIENTS OF FEDERAL FUNDS 2 (2013) (internal
quotation marks omitted), available at http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/cor/4yr-report.pdf
(quoting Assistant Attorney General for the Civil Rights Division, Thomas E. Perez).
3. See, e.g., The Civil Rights Act 40 Years Later, CENTER FOR AM. PROGRESS
(July 2, 2004), http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/women/news/2004/07/02/89 1/the-
civil-rights-act-40-years-later ("Title VI is a potentially powerful tool, but regrettably re-
mains the sleeping giant of civil rights laws.").
4. See Memorandum from Thomas E. Perez, Assistant Att'y Gen. for the Civil Rights
Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice, to Fed. Funding Agency Civil Rights Dirs. (Aug. 19, 2010),
available at http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/cor/titlevi memotp.pdf (offering resources on
behalf of the Department of Justice, which is charged with coordinating compliance with the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, to help agencies enhance enforcement efforts on the occasion of
Title VI's forty-fifth anniversary).
5. See, e.g., The Civil Rights Act 40 Years Later, supra note 3.
6. Alan Jenkins, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964: Racial Discrimination in
Federally Funded Programs, in 10 NAT'L LAWYERS GUILD, CIvIL RIGHTS LITIGATION AND
ATTORNEY FEES ANNUAL HANDBOOK 173, 193 (Steven Saltzman & Barbara M. Wolvovitz
eds., 1995).
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For those familiar with the provision, Title VI's potential has been easy to
map. Because of the broad reach of federal financial assistance into state, local,
and private institutions, Title VI provides a potentially powerful tool for ad-
dressing wide-ranging problems of racial and ethnic discrimination.7 The stat-
ute not only prohibits intentional discrimination, but its regulations provide that
funding recipients cannot "utilize criteria or methods of administration which
have the effect of subjecting individuals to discrimination because of their race,
color, or national origin." During the time when these regulations were
deemed privately enforceable, the statute provided an opportunity to address
discriminatory practices that might evade remedy if required to satisfy the con-
stitutional intent standard.9 Because of Title VI's breadth of coverage, advo-
cates urged its use beyond the traditional civil rights areas of education, em-
ployment, and housing to address the problems of environmental justice and
racial disparities in health care that began to be identified in the 1980s and
1990s. 10
Title VI's relative lack of prominence is nevertheless also easy to explain.
Few people, if any, describe themselves as Title VI lawyers. Only a handful of
Title VI cases have ever made it to the Supreme Court, and the number of Title
VI cases litigated each year has always paled in comparison to most other civil
rights statutes, particularly in comparison to the fair employment provisions of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Indeed, the key problem with Title VI has been
the question of private court enforcement. The statute contains no explicit pri-
vate right of action, and until the court effectively implied one in its sister stat-
ute, Title IX,11 would-be litigants were uncertain whether the statute was pri-
7. Id. at 173.
8. E.g., 28 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(2) (2013) (emphasis added); 49 C.F.R. § 21.5(b)(2)
(2013) (emphasis added).
9. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976) ("Disproportionate impact is
not irrelevant, but it is not the sole touchstone of an invidious racial discrimination forbidden
by the Constitution."). The Court's subsequent ruling in Village ofArlington Heights v. Met-
ropolitan Housing Development Corp. allows that circumstantial evidence, including impact,
may be relevant to proof of intent. 429 U.S. 252, 265-66 (1977) ("The impact of the official
action-whether it bears more heavily on one race than another-may provide an important
starting point [for determining invidious discriminatory purpose]." (citation omitted) (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted)). Yet as a practical matter the "intent" standard is still often
difficult for plaintiffs to meet.
10. See Jenkins, supra note 6, at 173 (contending that Title VI was "particularly well-
suited to address emerging civil rights issues such as environmental racism and racially in-
equitable health care" (footnote omitted)); Sidney D. Watson, Reinvigorating Title VI: De-
fending Health Care Discrimination-It Shouldn't Be So Easy, 58 FORDHAM L. REv. 939,
975-76 (1990) (proposing an evidentiary standard for using Title VI to address disparate im-
pact discrimination in the provision of health care).
11. See Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677 (1979) (finding a private cause of ac-
tion implicit in Title IX).
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vately enforceable.1 2 Outside of the school desegregation context, for much of
its history, it has been unclear what exactly to do with Title VI's great substan-
tive reach. And when private court enforcement activity began to pick up in the
late 1990s, the Court's 2001 decision in Alexander v. Sandoval held that, in
fact, no private right of action existed to enforce the statute's disparate impact
regulations, shutting down much of the statute's litigation promise. 13 Title VI's
struggles with private enforcement render it quite unlike any other major civil
rights statute: its story, such as it is, cannot be told primarily through court en-
forcement.
This Essay examines the question of private enforcement of Title VI. My
argument is that to focus primarily on private court enforcement of Title VI
will continue to relegate the provision to the margins of civil rights discourse,
to make the provision appear largely asleep. The practice of Title VI lawyering
entails not just efforts to seek compliance through courts and administrative
agencies, but a practice of implementation, expansion, and elaboration of the
provision that is not easily described, but through which Title VI gains mean-
ing. This Essay proceeds in three Parts. Part I shows how crucial decisions of
the Supreme Court served to render precarious the court enforcement regime of
Title VI. Part II argues that court enforcement has never told the full story of
how Title VI's regulatory regime is implemented. This Part provides accounts
of the role of private lawyers in shaping the rules and guidance under Title VI,
overseeing agency implementation of the provision, and using Title VI as a
starting point for more expansive forms of problem solving and advocacy. Part
III considers the future of these forms of private implementation. This Part ar-
gues that enriching our account of private implementation of Title VI serves to
reshape standard narratives of how civil rights norms are created and of what
constitutes civil rights lawyering.
I. POSSIBILITIES AND CONSTRAINTS OF PRIVATE COURT ENFORCEMENT
Private court enforcement of Title VI has always presented something of a
puzzle. Contrast Title VI with its better-known sister provision, Title VII,
which prohibits discrimination in employment.14 Title VII contains a private
12. See Jenkins, supra note 6, at 180 ("[T]here was uncertainty during the statute's
first 15 years of operation as to whether it would support an independent claim for relief.").
13. 532 U.S. 275 (2001).
14. Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer "to fail or refuse to hire or to dis-
charge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." Civil Rights Act of 1964, tit. VII, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(a)(I) (2012). It also makes it an unlawful employment practice for an employer
"to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way
which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or oth-
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right of action, allowing individuals to file a claim in court after first filing with
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC).15 We also know that
drafters conceived of private enforcement as the central way of enforcing Title
VII after Congress abandoned earlier plans of a strong federal enforcement
agency. 16 The Civil Rights Act of 1991 further strengthened Title VII's private
enforcement regime, providing compensatory and punitive damages to increase
incentives for litigation.17 Today, more litigation occurs under Title VII than
under any other federal civil rights statute, and the Supreme Court frequently
issues decisions on the scope of Title VII.18 There can be no doubt that private
enforcement is central to any understanding of Title VII.
The story of Title VI is different. The provision has no explicit language or
regulations allowing plaintiffs to file claims in court; agency regulations explic-
itly allow plaintiffs to bring administrative complaints. 19 Damages to individu-
als are not the typical remedy for a violation of Title VI; rather the goal of Title
VI's regime is securing compliance upon threat of termination of federal
erwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin." Id. § 2000e-2(a)(2).
15. See id. § 2000e-5(b), (e)-(f) (detailing the procedures for filing a Title VII charge
with the EEOC and for bringing claims in court). Individuals must first file a charge of dis-
crimination with the EEOC, and the EEOC then has 120 days to investigate the claim. See
id. § 2000e-5(b), (f)(1) (detailing administrative exhaustion requirements). After 180 days,
an individual may request that the EEOC issue a "notice of right to sue," which allows the
claimant to proceed with a complaint in federal or state court. See id. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (de-
scribing procedures for bringing suit); 29 C.F.R. § 1601.28 (2013) (same).
16. See SEAN FARHANG, THE LITIGATION STATE: PUBLIC REGULATION AND PRIVATE
LAWSUITS IN THE U.S. 117-19 (2010) (detailing legislative history behind Title VII's en-
forcement structure); see also id. at 106-09, 113-14 (describing the weakening of the
EEOC's enforcement powers after key congressional players resisted an agency with strong
adjudicative and enforcement powers). For an account of the legislative compromises that
permitted court suits but weakened agency enforcement, see Olatunde Johnson, The Last
Plank: Rethinking Public and Private Power to Advance Fair Housing, 13 U. PA. J. CONST.
L. 1191, 1205-06 (2011).
17. Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 102, 105 Stat. 1071, 1072-74 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 198 1a); see also FARHANG, supra note 16, at 190-92 (showing that Congress sought
to enhance private enforcement of Title VII by creating a damages remedy).
18. For recent Title VII cases, see University of Texas Southwest Medical Center v.
Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2534 (2013) (requiring a showing of but-for causation to recover
for claims of retaliation); Vance v. Ball State University, 133 S. Ct. 2434, 2439 (2013) (de-
fining "'supervisor' for purposes of vicarious liability under Title VII" as one "empowered
by the employer to take tangible employment actions against the victim"); Lewis v. City of
Chicago, 560 U.S. 205, 211 (2010) (holding that a plaintiff who fails to file a timely charge
when a disparate impact practice is adopted may challenge the later application of that prac-
tice in a disparate impact suit); and Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 563 (2009) (holding
that employers may take race-conscious steps to avoid disparate impact liability under Title
VII only where there is a "a strong basis in evidence" of such liability).
19. See, e.g., 34 C.F.R. § 100.7(b) (2013) (delineating the administrative complaint
procedures for the Department of Education); 45 C.F.R. § 80.7(b) (2013) (delineating the
administrative complaint procedures for the Department of Health and Human Services).
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funds.20 While the Supreme Court would come to imply a private right of ac-
tion to enforce the provision in court,21 litigation has always been less central
under Title VI than under Title VII. Indeed proponents introduced Title VI as
an alternative to litigation, a way of leveraging federal funds to promote school
desegregation and removing the litigation from courts "where they had been
bogged down for more than a decade" after the Brown decision. 22 As a leading
school desegregation expert Gary Orfield once put it: Title VI aimed "to make
litigation unnecessary." In this sense, Title VI grows out of a very different
strand of civil rights law than Title VII: one that begins in the New Deal and
uses executive and agency power to promote nondiscrimination. 24 And Title VI
grants agencies meaningful power to enforce the statute. Section 601 of Title
VI forbids discrimination in programs that receive federal funds, while section
602 gives agencies power to enforce this prohibition through binding regula-
tions. Contrast this grant of regulatory power with its absence in Title VII:
Congress granted the EEOC the power to issue only procedural-not binding
substantive-regulations under Title VII.25
Yet Title VI has never been only about executive power; private actors
have always been part of the implementation regime in agencies, to be sure, but
also in courts. Private administrative enforcement is an explicit part of Title
VI's enforcement regime, and the regime has also come to encompass private
court enforcement. Lower courts permitted litigation to directly enforce Title
VI quickly after enactment of the statute despite the lack of an explicit private
20. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (directing agencies to secure compliance by terminating
federal funds or "by any other means authorized by law"). Before terminating funds, an
agency must meet a set of requirements including providing notice, a hearing, an attempt at
voluntary compliance, and "an express finding on the record ... of a failure to comply" with
the statute. See id. Termination of funds is rare; agencies generally secure compliance
through a compliance agreement or "Memorandum of Understanding." See Jenkins, supra
note 6, at 178-80 (internal quotation marks omitted) (describing the sanction and compliance
process under Title VI).
21. The Court held in Cannon that Title IX, which is patterned on Title VI, was pri-
vately enforceable. Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 699-74 (1979).
22. COUNCIL OF THE WHITE HOUSE CONFERENCE "To FULFILL THESE RIGHTS,"
COUNCIL's REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE CONFERENCE 41 (1966); see also 110
CONG. REC. 7054 (1964) (statement of Sen. John Pastore).
23. STEPHEN C. HALPERN, ON THE LIMITS OF THE LAW: THE IRONIC LEGACY OF TITLE
VI OF THE 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT 44 (1995) (internal quotation mark omitted) (quoting Gary
Orfield).
24. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 8802, 3 C.F.R. 234 (1941) (establishing a "Committee
on Fair Employment Practice" and forbidding discrimination by federal agencies); Exec. Or-
der No. 10,479, 3 C.F.R. 961 (1953) (banning discrimination by contractors on federally fi-
nanced construction sites).
25. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, tit. VII, § 713, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-12 (granting the
EEOC the power to issue "suitable procedural regulations to carry out the provisions of this
subchapter").
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right of action.26 Congress in 1976 permitted recovery of attorneys' fees by
prevailing parties in Title VI cases, 27 thereby including the statute in a regime
that incentivizes private court enforcement of civil rights laws. Then the Su-
preme Court's decision in Cannon confirmed that a private right of action ex-
isted to enforce Title IX, Title VI's sister statute.28 Cannon addressed the ques-
tion of private enforcement of Title IX, which prohibits discrimination on the
basis of sex by educational institutions that receive federal funds.29 Title IX is
modeled on Title VI and similarly lacks express authorization of a private right
of action in court.30 The Cannon Court concluded that Title IX's language and
legislative history permitted implication of a private right of action, relying
heavily on the similarities between Title VI and Title IX.3 1 After Cannon, Con-
gress seemed to bring Title VI closer to the typical individual enforcement
model of a civil rights statute when it abrogated states' Eleventh Amendment
sovereign immunity in Title VI suits. 32
At the same time, private court enforcement has proved precarious under
Title VI, as seen in three cases considered in this Part. The first is Regents of
the University of Calfornia v. Bakke,33 which in finding that Title VI's antidis-
crimination provisions were coextensive with the Equal Protection Clause ef-
fectively limited the substantive reach of the statute. The second is the Adams
26. See, e.g., Bossier Parish Sch. Bd. v. Lemon, 370 F.2d 847, 852 (5th Cir. 1967)
(holding that Title VI was privately enforceable in the context of a school desegregation
case); see also Blackshear Residents Org. v. Hous. Auth., 347 F. Supp. 1138, 1140, 1145
(W.D. Tex. 1972); Hawthorne v. Kenbridge Recreation Ass'n, 341 F. Supp. 1382, 1383-84
(E.D. Va. 1972); S. Christian Leadership Conference, Inc. v. Connolly, 331 F. Supp. 940,
943 (E.D. Mich. 1971); Gautreaux v. Chi. Hous. Auth., 265 F. Supp. 582, 583-84 (N.D. Ill.
1967).
27. See Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-559, § 2,90
Stat. 2641, 2641 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1988) (providing that the "court, in its
discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attor-
ney's fee as part of the costs" (internal quotation mark omitted)).
28. See Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 717 (1979).
29. Education Amendments of 1972, tit. IX, § 901, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2012) ("No per-
son in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be de-
nied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activi-
ty receiving Federal financial assistance . . . .").
30. See Cannon, 441 U.S. at 683 (noting that the statute does not expressly authorize a
private right of action for injured parties).
31. See id. at 697-700 (finding that the language and legislative history of Title IX and
Title VI presumed the availability of private court enforcement). Lower courts subsequently
interpreted Cannon to apply to Title VI. See, e.g., Larry P. v. Riles, 793 F.2d 969, 977 n.3
(9th Cir. 1984).
32. See Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-506, § 1003, 100
Stat. 1807, 1845 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7); see also Franklin v. Gwin-
nett Cnty. Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 72 (1992) (reading this amendment to Title VI as a "vali-
dation of Cannon's holding").
33. 438 U.S. 265, 287 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J.).
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litigation, which in its final stages limited the ability of private actors to appeal
to courts when agencies fail to effectively enforce Title VI. 34 And the last is
Alexander v. Sandoval, which rejected private enforcement of the statute's dis-
parate impact regulations.35
A. Bakke and the Judicial Limits of Title VI "Itself"
Decided in 1978, Bakke is not really a decision about private court en-
forcement of Title VI, but the Court's ruling would come to have significant
implications for enforcement of Title VI. The Bakke case is known foremost for
addressing the question of whether higher education institutions could consider
race and ethnicity in their admissions. Less well known is that Bakke im-
portantly limits the scope of private enforcement of Title VI by holding that the
Title VI prohibition on discrimination must be read coextensively with the
Equal Protection Clause.36
This aspect of Bakke may have come as a surprise to anyone who was pay-
ing attention to the Court's Title VI jurisprudence. Just four years before Bakke,
the Court had faced the question of the scope of Title VI in Lau v. Nichols.37
Lau involved a class action lawsuit on behalf of non-English-speaking Chinese
students against the San Francisco Unified School District for its failure to pro-
vide the supplemental education and other interventions necessary to help them
learn English.38 The lower courts had rejected the plaintiffs' claim, ruling that
the disadvantages faced by the students were due to their own socioeconomic
background and were "created and continued completely apart from any contri-
bution by the school system." 39 Justice Douglas's very brief opinion for the
Court rejected that argument and reversed. Though Justice Douglas quoted the
central antidiscrimination language of Title VI, the holding appears to depend
on the regulations promulgated by the Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare (HEW) to enforce Title VI.40 These regulations forbade educational
practices with a discriminatory effect,41 required school districts to take steps to
34. 356 F. Supp. 92 (D.D.C.), modified, 480 F.2d 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (en banc) (per
curiam). For a discussion of the Adams litigation, see text accompanying notes 79-92 below.
35. 532 U.S. 275 (2001) (declining to imply a private right of action to enforce Title
VI's disparate impact regulations).
36. See infra notes 49-58 and accompanying text.
37. 414 U.S. 563 (1974).
38. See id. at 564.
39. Id. at 565 (quoting Lau v. Nichols, 483 F.2d 791, 797 (9th Cir. 1973)) (internal
quotation mark omitted).
40. Id. at 566-69.
41. See id. at 568 ("[A] recipient 'may not . .. utilize criteria or methods of administra-
tion which have the effect of subjecting individuals to discrimination' or have 'the effect of
defeating or substantially impairing accomplishment of the objectives of the program as re-
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LAWYERING THAT HAS NO NAME
address the needs of students with language deficiencies, 42 and prohibited
school districts from providing services to some students that were not provid-
ed to others (part of the factual context of the lawsuit was that 1000 non-
English-speaking Chinese students were receiving supplemental English-
language instruction, but another 1800 were not).43
Justice Douglas's opinion says so little that it is hard to discern the ques-
tions lurking in Lau-most fundamentally whether private individuals had the
power to enforce Title VI and its regulations, as well as the substantive scope
of "discrimination" prohibited by Title VI. For Justice Douglas, the questions
were easily resolved. The relevant enforcement frame was one of contract. The
school district had "contractually" agreed to be governed by Title VI and its
regulations," and the statute and regulations were within Congress's (and
HEW's) power,45 leaving only the question of whether the school district was
properly complying with this contract.
One of the concurring opinions provides hints of the debates that would
come in later cases regarding the enforceability and substantive scope of Title
VI. In his concurrence, Justice Stewart seemed doubtful that the prohibitions of
section 601, standing alone, provided a basis for the plaintiffs' claim. For Jus-
tice Stewart, the viability of the cause of action depended on the prohibitions of
the regulation, making the key question the validity of the regulations. Apply-
ing a pre-Chevron analysis that the regulation need only be "reasonably related
to the purposes of the enabling legislation" and that department regulations are
entitled to "great weight," Justice Stewart satisfied himself that the regulations
spect individuals of a particular race, color, or national origin."' (alteration in original) (quot-
ing 45 C.F.R. § 80.3(b)(2))).
42. See id. at 567 ("In 1970 HEW made the guidelines more specific, requiring school
districts that were federally funded 'to rectify the language deficiency in order to open' the
instruction to students who had 'language deficiencies."' (quoting Identification of Discrim-
ination and Denial of Services on the Basis of National Origin, 35 Fed. Reg. 11,595, 11,595
(July 18, 1970))).
43. See id. ("HEW's regulations specify that the recipients may not . . . '[p]rovide any
service, financial aid, or other benefit to an individual which is different, or is provided in a
different manner, from that provided to others under the program' [or] . . . '[r]estrict an indi-
vidual in any way in the enjoyment of any advantage or privilege enjoyed by others receiv-
ing any service, financial aid, or other benefit under the program."' (citation omitted) (quot-
ing 45 C.F.R. § 80.3(b)(1))); id. at 569 (Stewart, J., concurring) ("It is uncontested that more
than 2,800 schoolchildren of Chinese ancestry attend school in the San Francisco Unified
School District system even though they do not speak, understand, read, or write the English
language, and that as to some 1,800 of these pupils the respondent school authorities have
taken no significant steps to deal with this language deficiency.").
44. Id. at 568 (majority opinion).
45. See id. at 569 ("The Federal Government has power to fix the terms on which its
money allotments to the States shall be disbursed. Whatever may be the limits of that power,
they have not been reached here." (citation omitted)); see also id. at 566 ("The Department
of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) . . . has authority to promulgate regulations pro-
hibiting discrimination in federally assisted school systems.").
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were a valid exercise of HEW's authority.46 Justice Stewart's opinion also
carefully noted that the school district had not contested the plaintiffs' standing
to sue, which Stewart too seemed to frame as a question of contract law, casting
the plaintiffs as third-party "beneficiaries of the federal funding contract be-
tween" HEW and the school district. 47 Despite this lack of clarity, both the
statute and its regulations seemed to be privately enforceable after Lau. Four
years later, however, Bakke held that the statutory prohibitions of Title VI ex-
tended no further than the Constitution.
The plaintiffs in Bakke had argued that the admissions program of the med-
ical school of the University of California at Davis violated Title VI as well as
the Constitution by assuring admission for a specified number of minority stu-
dents.48 Following the canon of constitutional avoidance, Justice Powell's
opinion announcing the judgment of the Court addressed the statutory question
prior to the constitutional question.49 Justice Powell's first move was to as-
sume, without deciding the "difficult" question, that the statute creates a private
right of action. 50 Justice Powell next examined the meaning of "discrimination"
in section 601 of Title VI. 51 Admitting that the term "discrimination" is ame-
nable to different meanings, Justice Powell turned to Title VI's legislative his-
tory.52 Looking through the House and Senate legislative history of Title VI, he
found that Congress was concerned about the problems facing blacks, and that
Congress did not consider the question of racial preferences. 53 For support, Jus-
tice Powell relied on the language of Senator Hubert Humphrey, a key sponsor
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, that "the purpose of Title VI was 'to insure that
Federal funds are spent in accordance with the Constitution and the moral sense
of the Nation."' 54 Justice Powell drew also on remarks by Senator Abraham
Ribicoff, another proponent of the legislation, asserting that "there is a constitu-
tional restriction against discrimination in the use of federal funds; and title VI
46. See id. at 571 (Stewart, J., concurring) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also
id. at 572 n.3 ("The United States as amicus curiae ... and the [school district] appear to
concede, that the guidelines were issued pursuant to § 602.").
47. Id. at 571 n.2.
48. See 438 U.S. 265, 269-70 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J.).
49. Id. at 281 (citing Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 346-48 (1936)
(Brandeis, J., concurring)). The parties had initially not briefed the Title VI question, which
was not addressed by the courts below, so the Court ordered supplementary briefing on this
question. See id.
50. Id. at 283 (finding it unnecessary to "address this difficult issue" since the issue
was not argued or decided by the courts below).
51. Id. at 284.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 284-85.
54. Id. at 286 (quoting 110 CONG. REc. 6544 (1964) (statement of Sen. Hubert
Humphrey)).
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simply spells out the procedure to be used in enforcing that restriction."55
Against the plaintiffs' claim that Title VI forbade any consideration of race,
Justice Powell used this evidence to reject the notion that the statute enacted a
"purely color-blind scheme." 56 Rather, Justice Powell found that Congress was
concerned about ensuring equal treatment in the furtherance of "constitutional
principles." 57 Justice Powell concluded that "[i]n view of the clear legislative
intent, Title VI must be held to proscribe only those racial classifications that
would violate the Equal Protection Clause or the Fifth Amendment." 58
Justice Powell's decision sought to protect Title VI against a reading that
forbids all forms of racial distinction, a "purely color-blind scheme." Instead,
Justice Powell offered that Title VI is concerned with addressing caste, segre-
gation, and equality just as is the Fourteenth Amendment.59 But the decision
also limits Title VI by tethering it to the Court's view of the Equal Protection
Clause. 60
Bakke's pronouncements on Title VI shaped its private enforcement in the
years to come. As is well known, the central aspect of Justice Powell's Bakke
opinion-holding that the Equal Protection Clause allows institutions of higher
education to consider race and ethnicity as factors in their admissions program
in furtherance of "diversity"-was joined by no other Justice. 61 Yet Justice
Powell's argument that Title VI should be read as an implementation of the
Fourteenth Amendment effectively became binding law when four Justices
concurred in this aspect of the ruling. Justice Brennan (writing for himself and
Justices White, Marshall, and Blackmun) agreed that Title VI "goes no further
55. Id. (quoting 110 CONG. REc. 13,333 (1964) (statement of Sen. Abraham Ribicoff))
(internal quotation mark omitted).
56. Id. at 284.
57. Id. at 285.
58. Id. at 287.
59. See id. at 285 ("The problem confronting Congress was discrimination against Ne-
gro citizens at the hands of recipients of federal moneys. Indeed, the color blindness pro-
nouncements [of members of Congress] . . . generally occur in the midst of extended remarks
dealing with the evils of segregation in federally funded programs.").
60. Indeed, there is a dissonance between Justice Powell's reading of Title VI in light
of its anticaste legislative purpose and his acceptance of the argument that the Fourteenth
Amendment requires the same scrutiny of racial remedies as it does of policies informed by
a purpose to subjugate. See id. at 295 ("The concepts of 'majority' and 'minority' necessarily
reflect temporary arrangements and political judgments.").
61. In their partial concurrence, four Justices agreed with Justice Powell that "a plan
like the 'Harvard' [diversity] plan is constitutional under our approach, at least so long as the
use of race to achieve an integrated student body is necessitated by the lingering effects of
past discrimination." Id. at 326 n.l (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dis-
senting in part) (citation omitted). While most lower courts (and institutions) followed the
"diversity" rationale, its status as binding precedent was only assured after the Court revisit-
ed the question of race-conscious higher education admissions in Grutter v. Bollinger, 539
U.S. 306 (2003).
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in prohibiting the use of race than the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment itself."6 2
The effect of Bakke was to tie Title VI to the implementation of the Court's
own conception of equal protection, and to limit private litigants in advancing a
broader set of rights claims that might be furthered by statutory and regulatory,
as opposed to constitutional, norms. As Justice Brennan concluded after touring
its congressional history, Title VI "did not create any new standard of equal
treatment beyond that contained in the Constitution." 63 This conception of Title
VI would immediately place the Bakke decision in tension with the Court's rul-
ing in Lau, a point recognized by Justice Brennan's opinion. Lau could be read
to hold that Title VI prohibits some actions based on their effect on certain
groups.6 But two years after Lau, the Court held in Washington v. Davis that
the Equal Protection Clause does not forbid actions solely because they have a
racially disproportionate impact.65 After Bakke, the Davis holding would offer
a similar limiting principle for Title VI. As Justice Brennan realized, holding
that Title VI is no broader than the Constitution thus raised "serious doubts
concerning the correctness of what appears to be the premise of [the
Lau] decision." 66
This tethering of Title VI to judicially constructed meanings of equal pro-
tection is not an inevitable reading of the statute. Justice Brennan seemed to ac-
cept a more dynamic reading of the statute when he contended that judges, ad-
ministrative agencies, the passage of time, and experience would inform the
contours of Title VI's prohibition on "discrimination."67 Further, Justice Bren-
nan noted that the scope of the Equal Protection Clause was "in a state of flux
and rapid evolution" at the time Congress was constructing the Civil Rights Act
of 1964.68 And in reality, close examination of the legislative history reveals
little support for the notion that Congress would have limited Title VI to inten-
62. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 324-25 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dis-
senting in part). Of course these Justices took a more expansive view of the constitutional
mandate. Id. at 328 ("[Title VI] does not bar the preferential treatment of racial minorities as
a means of remedying past societal discrimination to the extent that such action is consistent
with the Fourteenth Amendment.").
63. Id. at 331.
64. See id. at 352 (noting that Lau could be read to mean that "Title VI proscribes
conduct which might not be prohibited by the Constitution"). In his opinion, Justice Powell
rejected the argument that Lau provided support for an idea of colorblindness. In doing so,
he distinguished Lau as resting "solely on the statute, which had been construed by the re-
sponsible administrative agency to reach educational practices" with a disparate impact. Id.
at 304 (opinion of Powell, J.). Interestingly, Justice Powell's opinion did not explore the po-
tential conflict between this aspect of Lau and Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
65. 426 U.S. 229.
66. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 352 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dis-
senting in part).
67. Id. at 337.
68. Id. at 339.
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tional discrimination. Introducing the provision that would become Title VI,
President Kennedy announced its broad goals, stating that "[s]imple justice re-
quires that public funds, to which all taxpayers of all races contribute, not be
spent in any fashion which encourages, eitrenches, subsidizes, or results in ra-
cial discrimination."69 Key sponsor Senator Humphrey indicated that Title VI
prohibits practices of segregation and discrimination that result in racial dis-
crimination even where they may not be unconstitutional (such as when funds
go to support private, segregated institutions). Rather, he stated that the purpose
of Title VI was to "insure that Federal funds are spent in accordance with the
Constitution and the moral sense of the Nation."70 Several of Title VI's propo-
nents did align the statute with the Constitution, but at the time of the passage
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 there was no sharp distinction in constitutional
law between intent and impact,7 1 and members of Congress articulated consti-
tutional norms that went beyond intent or invidiousness. 72 But while Justice
Brennan acknowledged that the meaning of Title VI "could be shaped by expe-
rience, administrative necessity, and evolving judicial doctrine,"7 3 the Court's
core holding seems to render Title VI a procedure for terminating funds or en-
couraging voluntary compliance with norms determined solely by reference to
the Court's constitutional rulings.
69. CIVIL RIGHTS: MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc.
No. 88-124, at 12 (1963).
70. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 332-33 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part) (quoting 110 CONG. REc. 6544 (1964) (statement of Sen. Hubert Humph-
rey)) ("In many instances the practices of segregation or discrimination, which title VI seeks
to end, are unconstitutional. This is clearly so wherever Federal funds go to a State agency
which engages in racial discrimination. It may also be so where Federal funds go to support
private, segregated institutions.. . . In all cases, such discrimination is contrary to national
policy, and to the moral sense of the Nation. Thus, title VI is simply designed to insure that
Federal funds are spent in accordance with the Constitution and the moral sense of the Na-
tion." (quoting 110 CONG. REC. at 6544 (statement of Sen. Hubert Humphrey)) (internal quo-
tation mark omitted)).
71. See, e.g., Hawkins v. Town of Shaw, 437 F.2d 1286, 1290 (5th Cir. 1971), aff'd,
461 F.2d 1171 (5th Cir. 1972) (per curiam); Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 497
(D.D.C. 1967), af'd sub nom. Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (en banc).
72. See, e.g., 110 CONG. REc. at 1528 (statement of Rep. Emanuel Celler) ("[T]he
Constitution may impose on the United States an affirmative duty to preclude racial segrega-
tion or discrimination by the recipient of Federal aid."). See generally Charles F. Abernathy,
Title VI and the Constitution: A Regulatory Model for Defining "Discrimination," 70 GEO.
L.J. 1, 29-30 (1981) (providing evidence of the lack of agreement among members of the
legislative and executive branches on the meaning of discrimination).
73. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 337 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dis-
senting in part); see also id. at 338 ("Specific definitions [of discrimination] were undesira-
ble, in the views of the legislation's principal backers, because Title VI's standard was that
of the Constitution and one that could and should be administratively and judicially ap-
plied."); id. at 339 (noting that Attorney General Robert Kennedy testified that the "rules and
regulations defining discrimination might differ from one program to another so that the
term would assume different meanings in different contexts").
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The limitations of hitching Title VI to court-determined equal protection
are made plain by Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke. Justice Powell's analysis
of the constitutional contours of affirmative action depends on the judiciary's
institutional context: he noted that the judiciary lacks competence to determine
which groups should benefit from affirmative action.74 (The Court's solution
was to review all equal protection claims under strict scrutiny.) These same
considerations may be less compelling when administrative actors participate in
defining the meaning of "discrimination." This hitching excises the broader set
of inclusionary norms that Title VI seems to encompass or permit-that subsi-
dization might perpetuate forms of inequality, and that government actors have
an affirmative duty to promote inclusion. 75
A final problem with Bakke is that it produced an uneasy peace between
Title VI and its regulations-raising inevitable questions about how far beyond
a prohibition on "intentional discrimination" agency regulations could extend.
Relevant to the examination here of private enforcement, Bakke made the sub-
stantive scope and the private enforceability of Title VI less certain. Title VI
would not necessarily be a location for staking new forms of rights claims not
already recognized by the Constitution. And, five years later, a majority of Jus-
tices relied on Bakke to conclude that Title VI itself by its terms was limited to
intentional discrimination. 76 Bakke would also make consequential the Court's
holding-several decades later in Sandoval-that Title VI's regulations are not
privately enforceable.77
B. Adams and the Limits ofJudicial Oversight
Court decisions have also curtailed another potential avenue of private
court enforcement of Title VI: judicial review of agency failure to enforce the
74. Id. at 296-97 (opinion of Powell, J.) ("There is no principled basis for deciding
which groups would merit 'heightened judicial solicitude' and which would not. . . . The
kind of variable sociological and political analysis necessary to produce such rankings simp-
ly does not lie within the judicial competence-even if they otherwise were politically feasi-
ble and socially desirable.").
75. Drafters and early shapers of Title VI often referenced it as a vehicle not just for
cleansing federal funds of unconstitutional practices, but of advancing substantive inclusion.
See, e.g., GARY ORFIELD, THE RECONSTRUCTION OF SOUTHERN EDUCATION: THE SCHOOLS
AND THE 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT 94 (1969) (citing a 1965 memorandum in which the U.S.
Commissioner of Education wrote that "Title VI can become ... a condition necessary to
progress in the future").
76. See Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582, 610-11 (1983) (Pow-
ell, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 612 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment); id.
at 642 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The opinion was highly fractured, but the Court in a subse-
quent opinion addressing the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (which was modeled on Title VI),
interpreted Guardians as holding that "Title VI itself directly reached only instances of in-
tentional discrimination." See Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 293 (1985).
77. See discussion infra Part I.C.
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statute. If Title VI's main regulatory approach is to require the executive
branch to enforce rules, the question naturally becomes what happens when an
agency fails to enforce? A court order to enforce does not appear to be part of
the answer. In Women's Equity Action League v. Cavazos, the D.C. Circuit held
that private parties could not bring court actions against federal officials for
failing to enforce Title VI.7
The case reversed an earlier holding by the D.C. Circuit in the landmark
Adams litigation. By several accounts, HEW's Office for Civil Rights did little
to enforce the Civil Rights Act of 1964's prohibition of segregation in institu-
tions of higher education.79 By the time of the Nixon Administration, enforce-
ment of Title VI was "lax" according to civil rights groups.80 In response, the
NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund (LDF) initiated litigation in the
District Court for the District of Columbia alleging that HEW officials had
failed to enforce Title VI.81 The district court agreed, requiring the agency to
start compliance procedures against ten state systems of higher education.82
The D.C. Circuit sustained the action, holding that the terms of Title VI were
not so broad as to preclude judicial review.83
Initially, Adams was a success. The plaintiffs achieved an order from the
district court requiring that HEW comply with deadlines for processing admin-
istrative complaints.8 4 The litigation continued through the 1980s with the
court ordering HEW to refuse approval of state higher education lans that
were insufficient in dismantling dual systems of higher education. At one
point in the litigation, the district court ordered HEW to hire additional civil
rights workers to enforce the Adams decree with respect to higher education in-
stitutions.86
78. 906 F.2d 742, 748 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
79. See GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABoUT
SOCIAL CHANGE? 55 (1991) (explaining that until 1968 the Office for Civil Rights had no
compliance review program for higher education institutions, and as late as January 1975
had only terminated funds to two small institutions).
80. See JACK GREENBERG, CRUSADERS IN THE COURTS: HOW A DEDICATED BAND OF
LAWYERS FOUGHT FOR THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION 395 (1994).
81. See Adams v. Richardson, 356 F. Supp. 92 (D.D.C.), modified, 480 F.2d 1159
(D.C. Cir. 1973) (en banc) (per curiam).
82. See id. at 94-95. The plaintiffs had also challenged the agency's failure to vigor-
ously enforce Title VI with regard to certain primary and secondary institutions, and the dis-
trict court ordered that the agency start enforcement proceedings against nearly 200 school
districts that were out of compliance with Title VI or the Supreme Court's school desegrega-
tion rulings. See id. at 96-97.
83. See Adams, 480 F.2d at 1162 (rejecting applicability of Citizens to Preserve Over-
ton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971)).
84. See Adams, 356 F. Supp. at 95.
85. See Adams v. Califano, 430 F. Supp. 118, 120-21 (D.D.C. 1977).
86. See Adams v. Bell, 711 F.2d 161, 176 n.24 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (en banc) (Wright, J.,
dissenting); GREENBERG, supra note 80, at 397.
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However, subsequent decisions limited the initial reach of Adams. In the
1970s, the Adams litigation expanded to include not just Title VI, but also Title
IX and the Rehabilitation Act, encompassing allegations of noncompliance ex-
tending to programs in fifty states, not just by HEW and its successor the De-
partment of Education, but also by the Department of Labor.87 The expanded
case came before the D.C. Circuit in Cavazos, and the court ruled that there
would be limits to court oversight. According to the D.C. Circuit, the action,
which began as a school desegregation case, had expanded to "colossal propor-
tions" and the claims had shifted from a deliberate agency policy of
nonenforcement to arguments that agencies had failed to execute compliance as
"promptly or expeditiously as plaintiffs would like."89 The court held that
plaintiffs had no right to "across-the-board judicial supervision" of federal
agency enforcement activities.90 According to the court, this conclusion was
the inevitable result of the Supreme Court's ruling in Cannon, which, in imply-
ing a private right of action under Title IX to maintain claims against grant re-
cipients, held that plaintiffs in Title IX and Title VI cases could not maintain
suits directly against agencies for failure to enforce the law.91 For similar rea-
sons, the court also declined to find a right to pursue a remedy under the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act, reasoning that Cannon's grant of a private court
remedy took away judicial oversight of federal government enforcement. 92
The bottom line of the D.C. Circuit's decision is that private parties cannot
bring suits to require agencies to more vigorously enforce Title VI, thus limit-
ing the ability of private litigants to use courts as a means of agency oversight.
87. See Women's Equity Action League v. Cavazos, 906 F.2d 742, 745 (D.C. Cir.
1990) (describing expansion of the Adams litigation); see also id. at 746 (detailing
"swell[ing]" of litigation to include other "statutory civil rights guarantees").
88. See id. at 748-79; see also HALPERN, supra note 23, at 290 ("[Courts] made it evi-
dent ... that it was the sprawling and unwieldy expansion of the Adams litigation that neces-
sitated its dissolution.").
89. Women's Equity Action League, 906 F.2d at 744-45 (internal quotation mark
omitted).
90. Id. at 749.
91. See id. at 747 ("The message of Cannon was that no private right of action should
be inferred from federal legislation absent a showing of approbation from the lawmaking
branch. Moreover, Cannon's examination of the legislative history of Title VI suggested that
Congress wished to ward off suits against the government of the very kind plaintiffs now
press." (citations omitted)).
92. A prior decision by the D.C. Circuit ruled that review under section 704 of the
Administrative Procedure Act was inappropriate for plaintiffs who had other remedies. See
Council of & for the Blind of Del. Cnty. Valley, Inc. v. Regan, 709 F.2d 1521, 1531 (D.C.
Cir. 1983) (en banc). In Women's Equity Action League, the D.C. Circuit relied on Council
of& for the Blind in ruling that Cannon precluded Administrative Procedure Act review. See
906 F.2d at 751 ("So far as we can tell, the suit targeting specific discriminatory acts of fund
recipients is the only court remedy Congress has authorized for private parties .... ). The
D.C. Circuit also relied on Council of& for the Blind to reject plaintiffs' argument that they
had a right of action under either the Mandamus Act or the Constitution. Id. at 752.
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C. Sandoval and the Limits ofPrivate Enforcement
The D.C. Circuit relied on the availability of private court enforcement to
limit oversight suits against agencies, but the Supreme Court subsequently
placed important limits on the scope of private court enforcement. As even cas-
ual observers of Title VI know, the Court held in Alexander v. Sandoval that
Title VI's disparate impact regulations were not privately enforceable.93 The
case presented a devastating blow to the efforts of civil rights groups to expand
disparate impact litigation under Title VI.94 Disparate impact counters the dif-
ficulties often associated with proving intentional discrimination, and allows
redress of contemporary forms of exclusion not traceable to judicial under-
standings of intentional discrimination.
The great potential of private enforcement of Title VI's disparate impact
regulations can be seen in important cases brought in the 1980s and 1990s that
challenged practices that led to the overrepresentation of minority children in
special education classes 95 and disproportionate siting of heavily polluting fa-
cilities in minority communities. 96 One of the most groundbreaking uses of Ti-
tle VI was the litigation concerning public transportation inequities in Los An-
geles. Minority bus riders challenged the Los Angeles County Metropolitan
Transportation Authority (MTA) for funding and expanding rail services uti-
lized largely by suburban, white commuters, while reducing funding for buses
primarily ridden by minorities.97 These practices, the plaintiffs asserted, consti-
tuted both intentional discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause
and disparate impact discrimination in violation of Title VI and its regula-
tions.98 After the district court found that the MTA's actions violated Title VI's
disparate impact regulations, the MTA and the plaintiffs negotiated a consent
decree that increased funding and services for the bus system. 9
93. 532 U.S. 275 (2001).
94. See Philip Tegeler, Title VI Enforcement in the Post-Sandoval Era, POVERTY &
RACE (Poverty & Race Research Action Council, Wash., D.C.), Sept.-Oct. 2010, at 5, 5 (dis-
cussing the devastating effect of Sandoval on civil rights advocacy).
95. See Larry P. v. Riles, 793 F.2d 969, 981-83 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding that the edu-
cational practices that disproportionately placed black students in special education classes
lacked adequate justification and violated Title VI).
96. See Chester Residents Concerned for Quality Living v. Seif, 132 F.3d 925, 927-28,
937 (3d Cir. 1997) (allowing the plaintiffs to go forward with their claim that a state's issu-
ance of permits to operate waste processing facilities in a predominantly black community
violated Title VI), vacated, 524 U.S. 974 (1998).
97. See Labor/Cmty. Strategy Ctr. v. L.A. Cnty. Metro. Transp. Auth., 263 F.3d 1041,
1043-44 (9th Cir. 2001) (summarizing the plaintiffs' claims).
98. See Labor/Cmty. Strategy Ctr. v. L.A. Cnty. Metro. Transp. Auth., 564 F.3d 1115,
1117 & n.1 (9th Cir. 2009).
99. Labor/Cmty. Strategy Ctr., 263 F.3d at 1043-44 (holding that the district court and
the special master properly interpreted the consent decree the parties had reached). As a stu-
dent intern at LDF, I assisted in the initial stages of this litigation.
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The Sandoval case put a practical end to this strategy of private court en-
forcement of disparate impact rules. A key element of the Court's ruling de-
pended on the Bakke holding that Title VI itself reached no further than the
Constitution.100 A majority of Justices in Guardians, which held that there was
a private right of action to enforce Title VI, had relied on Bakke to construe the
Title VI statute as limited to intentional discrimination. 101 Five Justices, how-
ever, had also held that the disparate impact regulations issued pursuant to Title
VI were a valid exercise of agencies' authority to effectuate its provisions.102
The holding in Guardians about the scope of the substantive prohibitions of Ti-
tle VI did not necessarily answer whether these presumably valid disparate im-
pact regulations could be privately enforceable. This question was answered in
Sandoval when five Justices agreed with the state defendant that the private
right of action did not extend to Title VI's regulations. 103
Much has been written about the doctrinal implications of the case.104 The
practical implications for Title VI enforcement in court are clear: an end to the
private court enforcement of disparate impact regulations. Most advocates
characterize Title VI as substantially weakened as a result of the decision, and
prominent groups have subsequently sought legislation allowing private en-
forcement claims.105
In different ways Sandoval, Bakke, and Adams limit the ways in which pri-
vate actors can utilize courts to implement Title VI. In the next Part, I show that
court implementation interacts with a richer regulatory regime of which courts
are only part. Part III then looks at how private actors have deployed regulatory
and other nonlitigation strategies to implement and shape the meaning of Title
VI.
100. See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 280-81 (2001).
101. See Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582, 610-11 (1983) (Pow-
ell, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 612 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment); id.
at 641 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also supra note 76 (noting highly fractured nature of the
Guardians decision).
102. See id. at 591-92 (opinion of White, J.); id. at 623-24 (Marshall, J., dissenting); id.
at 642-45 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
103. See Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 293.
104. See, e.g., Pamela S. Karlan, Disarming the Private Attorney General, 2003 U. ILL.
L. REv. 183, 197-98 (situating the Sandoval decision within the Court's jurisprudence on
implied rights of action).
105. See Tegeler, supra note 94, at 5 (describing the impact of Sandoval on advocacy
efforts and initial efforts to pursue a legislative "fix" for the decision (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
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II. SHAPING REGULATION
Title VI's less prominent status in the canon of civil rights laws is perhaps
explained by the relatively low visibility of Title VI in courts, which emerges in
part from the uncertain private court enforcement regime described in Part I.
Yet to focus on Title VI's enforcement in courts likely understates the role of
private lawyers in the enforcement and implementation of Title VI. Behind ex-
amples of strong executive enforcement of Title VI stand private lawyers. For
instance, commentators have long credited Title VI with an important role in
helping advance school desegregation after Brown v. Board of Education.106
After passage of Title VI, the threat of the loss of federal funds alone led a sig-
nificant number of school districts to desegregate. 107 Other school districts,
however, required more aggressive use of Title VI by executive branch authori-
ties, including federal investigations and the commencement of proceedings to
terminate federal funds. 08 Yet this type of executive enforcement itself de-
pended on private enforcement activity. Administrative comlaints and litiga-
tion were the most visible part of this enforcement scheme10 -a strategy that
leverages the explicit role the statute gives to individuals to bring complaints
before agencies.110 But implementation of Title VI to advance school desegre-
gation also entailed lawyering advocacy to create expansive rules and prod
agency enforcement to move school systems toward meaningful integration.
This work outside of courts should also be understood as lawyering to imple-
ment and enforce Title VI. Such advocacy creates locations for elaborating the
meaning of Title VI that extend beyond the strictures imposed by court deci-
sions like Sandoval and Bakke to encompass some of the norms underlying Ti-
tle VI, including dismantling patterns of exclusion, preventing subsidization of
inequality, and using government funds and programs to affirmatively further
inclusion.
In this Part, I show how Title VI lawyering is manifest in advocacy to
shape the rules and guidance that govern regulated actors (rules that sometimes
emerge after private administrative and judicial enforcement actions), oversight
of agencies' implementation and enforcement, and leveraging of Title VI com-
106. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
107. See, e.g., ORFIELD, supra note 74, at 228, 262-63 (noting that Virginia's enforce-
ment of Title VI school desegregation guidelines and the "lure" of federal funds contributed
to desegregation gains, that early Title VI enforcement efforts by HEW were successful, and
that "[t]he Civil Rights Act forced Virginia to choose between segregation and progress" and
the state "chose progress"); ROSENBERG, supra note 79, at 97-100 (collecting data and re-
ports showing that financial inducements prompted important increases in desegregation and
specifically noting that "along with the lure of federal dollars was the threat of having them
taken away" through federal enforcement proceedings).
108. See ROSENBERG, supra note 79, at 50-54, 97-100.
109. See infra notes 116-19 and accompanying text (describing the work of private civil
rights lawyers in enforcing Title VI).
110. See supra note 19.
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plaints outside the strictures of the regulatory regime to prompt remedies and
gain broader public visibility for particular problems. This type of lawyering
itself takes many forms, with lawyers not only bringing lawsuits and drafting
administrative complaints, but proposing and drafting regulations, and working
with policy experts and community-based organizations to advocate for best
practices and policy solutions.
A. Expanding Rules
1. School desegregation
The role of lawyers in shaping Title VI's regulatory regime is most promi-
nent in the context of efforts to achieve school desegregation in the 1960s
through the 1970s. By many accounts, enforcement of Title VI by HEW was a
significant contributing factor in the desegregation of Southern school dis-
tricts. 111 After enactment of Title VI in 1964, HEW issued guidelines that pro-
vided federal funds only to school districts that submitted plans showing that
they had either desegregated their school systems, had submitted to court-
ordered plans, or would pursue voluntary desegregation plans.l12 HEW
strengthened the rules on what constituted acceptable voluntary desegregation
plans in 1965 and further tightened these rules in March 1966.113 In March
1968, HEW issued more specific regulations requirin "complete desegregation
by the fall of 1968, or, in some cases, fall of 1969."11
When academic commentators recognize the power of executive enforce-
ment of Title VI, particularly in comparison to the prior slow decade of school
desegregation litigation in courts, they credit HEW enforcement of these guide-
lines.1 15 Yet even this story of agency power depended in part on the role of
private lawyers, whose judicial and political advocacy crucially helped shaped
the rules that guided HEW enforcement. Rulings achieved in private constitu-
tional litigation interacted with agency rules. The school desegregation litiga-
tion brought by civil rights lawyers became a key location for affirming and en-
forcing HEW's guidelines.11 6 Commentators have noted that many Southern
Ill. See ROSENBERG, supra note 79, at 48-54 (reporting a range of data and results
showing the impact of HEW's Title VI enforcement efforts on school desegregation in the
South); id. at 53 (reporting findings that "districts desegregating under HEW pressure were
less segregated in 1972 than were districts desegregating under court orders" although the
districts that desegregated under court order "were more segregated to start with").
112. See id. at 48.
113. See id.
114. Id.
115. See, e.g., ORFIELD, supra note 75, at 262-63; ROSENBERG, supra note 79, at 48.
116. See, e.g., Singleton v. Jackson Mun. Separate Sch. Dist., 348 F.2d 729, 730-31 (5th
Cir. 1965) (giving "great weight" to guidelines set by HEW's Office of Education in requir-
ing a school district to desegregate four grades); Price v. Denison Indep. Sch. Dist. Bd. of
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school districts preferred desegregation administered by courts rather than by
administrators,1 17 and that Title VI became more effective when courts (in par-
ticular the Fifth Circuit) embraced the HEW guidelines. 118 HEW's enforcement
activities would not have been possible without willing administrators, and the
guidelines no doubt provoked strong opposition from many school districts and
congressional opponents of school desegregation.1 9 Yet the example of school
desegregation shows how private litigation interacted with executive power to
amplify the power of Title VI.
2. Transportation equality directives
More recently, the role of private lawyers has been evident in the shaping
of Title VI's regulations in the area of transportation equity. Over the past dec-
ade, the Department of Transportation (DOT) has promulgated a remarkable set
of rules and guidance implementing Title VI. The DOT's Federal Transit Ad-
ministration (FTA), which provides funding for mass transit both via formula
and on a discretionary basis, requires that certain grant recipients conduct im-
pact assessments of their programs and activities on minority communities and
take steps to remedy and avoid practices that have a disparate impact.120 In par-
ticular, large mass transit programs are required to gather and analyze data to
ensure that minority communities are benefiting fairly from mass transit pro-
Educ., 348 F.2d 1010, 1012-13, app. (5th Cir. 1965) (requiring adherence to HEW's 1965
guidelines, and appending the HEW guidelines to the decision). Litigation brought directly
by HEW against school districts also played a pivotal role in the enforcement of the guide-
lines. See, e.g., United States v. Jefferson Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836, 845, 847-48,
856-57 (5th Cir. 1966) (upholding HEW's 1966 guidelines), aff'd, 380 F.2d 385 (5th Cir.
1967) (en banc) (per curiam).
117. See HALPERN, supra note 23, at 48 (quoting a HEW official as noting that school
boards often found it "'politically more comfortable' to be forced to desegregate by court
order").
118. See id. at 42 (discussing the "synergistic" relationship between HEW and the fed-
eral courts that would produce between 1964 and 1968 the "first major successes" in ad-
dressing school segregation in the South); ROSENBERG, supra note 79, at 100 (describing
how HEW guidelines empowered courts to enforce school desegregation norms).
119. See HALPERN, supra note 23, at 47-48 (detailing Southern opposition to the 1965
guidelines); id at 54-57 (detailing congressional and Southern opposition to the 1966 guide-
lines).
120. See 49 C.F.R. §§ 21.1, 21.3, 21.5 (2013) (imposing requirements of nondiscrimi-
nation and inclusion on federal grantees); FED. TRANSIT ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP.,
CIRCULAR FTA C 4702.1A, TITLE VI AND TITLE VI-DEPENDENT GUIDELINES FOR FEDERAL
TRANSIT ADMINISTRATION RECIPIENTS 11-1 to -3 (2007), available at http://www.fta.dot.gov/
documents/Title_VI_Circular_4702.1A.pdf (listing guidelines intended to increase access to
mass transit, promote participation in planning by underrepresented groups, and prevent ra-
cial and ethnic disparities in the environmental effects of transportation).
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grams,121 to determine whether significant system-wide changes in services
and fares have a discriminatory impact on minority groups, 122 to conduct ongo-
ing monitoring to ensure that prior decisions are not having a disparate im-
pact,123 and to take corrective action to remedy found disparities.124 Funding
recipients must also integrate into their programs environmental justice con-
cerns-determining whether their programs and activities have adverse health
and environmental impacts on minority communities and taking efforts to miti-
gate or avoid these impacts.125 These rules require grantees to include under-
represented groups in transportation planning by, among other efforts, conduct-
ing outreach to minorities and persons with limited English proficiency and fur-
thering participation by these groups.126 The Federal Highway Administration,
the office of the DOT that administers surface transit programs, similarly re-
quires that grant recipients evaluate the environmental justice impact of their
programs and assess the impact of their transportation projects on communities
before taking action. 127
In prior writing, I have called these rules implementing Title VI "equality
directives," because they place affirmative requirements of equity and inclusion
on state and local grantees and use ex ante regulatory power rather than relying
primarily on ex post court enforcement.128 In this sense, the rules might be cast
as a manifestation of regulatory rather than private power. Transportation is a
particularly fitting place for such affirmative government intervention. Federal,
state, and local decisions concerning the funding and construction of transit and
highway development powerfully shape patterns of race, class, and ethnic in-
clusion. Past federal funding for highway development has helped construct
121. See FED. TRANSIT ADMIN., supra note 120, at V-1 ("Requirement to Collect De-
mographic Data").
122. See id. at V-5 ("Requirement to Evaluate Service and Fare Changes").
123. See id. at V-7 ("Requirement to Monitor Transit Service").
124. See id. ("If a recipient's monitoring determines that prior decisions have resulted
in disparate impacts, agencies shall take corrective action to remedy the disparities.").
125. See id. at IV-4 ("Guidance on Conducting an Analysis of Construction Projects").
126. See id. ("[Grantees] should seek out and consider the viewpoints of minority, low-
income, and [limited English proficient] populations in the course of conducting public out-
reach and involvement activities.").
127. See FED. HIGHWAY ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., COMMUNITY IMPACT
ASSESSMENT: A QUICK REFERENCE FOR TRANSPORTATION (1996), available at
http://www.ciatrans.net/CIAQuick-Reference/Purpose.html; FED. HIGHWAY ADMIN., U.S.
DEP'T OF TRANSP., FHWA ORDER 6640.23A, FHWA ACTIONS TO ADDRESS ENVIRONMENTAL
JUSTICE IN MINORITY POPULATIONS AND LOW-INCOME POPULATIONS (2012), available at
htttp://www.fhwa.dot.govlegsregs/directives/orders/664023a.htm (establishing policies and
procedures for the Federal Highway Administration's compliance with a 1994 executive or-
der on environmental justice).
128. See Olatunde C.A. Johnson, Beyond the Private Attorney General: Equality Direc-
tives in American Law, 87 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1339, 1362-63 (2012) (describing "equality direc-
tives" emerging from civil rights statutes which place proactive and affirmative duties on
actors within the administrative state).
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patterns of urban-suburban settlement, contributing to concentrated poverty and
spatial segregation that persists today.129 Decisions on how to construct and
subsidize mass transit influence poor, minority communities' access to re-
sources such as jobs, schools, green space, and effective social networks. 130
Regulatory and programmatic decisions have constructed contemporary transit
patterns; these Title VI rules harness this same power to reshape a segregated
and unequal transit landscape.
Further, the story of the development of these rules is instructive as to how
one might unleash Title VI's administrative power. A 1994 executive order
commanded federal agencies to implement Title VI, requiring them to incorpo-
rate environmental justice concerns in their planning and regulations. 3 1 A sub-
sequent 2000 executive order required agencies to take affirmative steps to de-
velop rules providing "meaningful access" and increased participation in
federal programs for persons with limited English proficiency.' 32 With these
129. See DOLORES HAYDEN, BUILDING SUBURBIA: GREEN FIELDS AND URBAN GROWTH,
1820-2000, at 166 (2003) (describing how the construction of highways "destroyed many
older neighborhoods, especially those inhabited by people of color"); JOHN R. LOGAN &
BRIAN J. STULTs, THE PERSISTENCE OF SEGREGATION IN THE METROPOLIS: NEW FINDINGS
FROM THE 2010 CENSUS 1, 4 (2011), available at http://www.s4.brown.edu/us2010/Datal
Report/report2.pdf (documenting high black-white segregation levels); PATRICK SHARKEY,
STUCK IN PLACE: URBAN NEIGHBORHOODS AND THE END OF PROGRESS TOWARD RACIAL
EQUALITY 26-33 (2013) (introducing data showing a much higher likelihood that black chil-
dren will be raised in neighborhoods of concentrated poverty than white children and argu-
ing that this is a key contributor to contemporary patterns of racial inequality).
130. See, e.g., THOMAS W. SANCHEZ ET AL., THE RIGHT TO TRANSPORTATION: MOVING
To EQUITY 1-2, 53-57 (2007) (discussing the "spatial mismatch" between where low-income,
urban, and often predominantly minority households live and where their jobs are located);
James H. Carr & Nandinee K. Kutty, The New Imperative for Equality, in SEGREGATION:
THE RISING COSTS FOR AMERICA 1, 17-20 (James H. Carr & Nandinee K. Kutty eds., 2008)
(detailing segregated, poor communities' lack of access to high-quality schools); Thomas W.
Sanchez, The Impact of Public Transport on US Metropolitan Wage Inequality, 39 URB.
STUD. 423, 434 (2002) (finding links between the availability of public transportation and
wage inequality in large metropolitan areas).
131. See Exec. Order No. 12,898, 3 C.F.R. 859 (1994), reprinted as amended in 5
U.S.C. § 4321 app. (2012) (directing all federal agencies to integrate environmental justice
concerns into their programs and planning by evaluating the environmental and human
health effects of their programs and policies on minority and low-income communities); id.
at 860 (requiring each agency to develop an environmental justice strategy that identifies the
programs, policies, public participation process, and rulemakings related to human health or
the environment, and that promotes public participation in decisionmaking and research); id.
at 861 (requiring federal agencies "whenever practical and appropriate" to collect and ana-
lyze information to determine whether their programs, policies, or activities have a dispro-
portionate effect on minority and low-income populations); id. at 862 (requiring federal
agencies to promote public participation in decisionmaking related to the environment
through public hearings and a notice provision, and to translate documents for limited Eng-
lish proficient populations).
132. Exec. Order No. 13,166, 3 C.F.R. 289 (2000), reprinted as amended in 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000d-1 app. (2012).
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presidential directives, the DOT promulgated the more specific guidance to
grantees, which now requires impact assessments of major programmatic
changes, outreach to minority and traditionally underserved communities, and
mitigation of harmful disparities.133 The DOT promotes compliance with these
regulatory objectives by providing grantees information on how to effectively
conduct impact assessments, provide outreach, and ensure public participa-
tion, 134 and by withholding federal funds from jurisdictions that fail to effec-
tively comply with Title VI's directives. 135
Yet this is not simply a story about agency power. The advocacy of non-
governmental organizations and lawyers has proved crucial in the unleashing of
Title VI's regulatory force in the area of transportation. One must recall that
Sandoval-the decision that eliminated a private right of action for Title VI's
regulations-was a transportation case. The case arose from an effort to pro-
vide access to driver's licenses in Alabama for individuals not proficient in
English.136 In strengthening its affirmative Title VI guidance after the Sandoval
decision, the DOT emphasized that the elimination of a private right of action
would likely lead to an increase in administrative complaints by private par-
ties. 137 In this instrumental way, the threat of private enforcement through the
administrative complaint structure has likely played a role in the adoption of
front-end rules. Grantees can more effectively shield themselves from after-the-
fact complaints from advocates and community groups by including those
groups in planning decisions, and by assessing the potential impact of pro-
gramming and evaluating alternatives.
Beyond the practical concerns, private enforcement has played a role by
framing the issue of transportation equity. Litigation, administrative com-
133. See, e.g., Letter from Peter Rogoff, Adm'r of Fed. Transit Admin., U.S. Dep't of
Transp., to Colleague (Mar. 8, 2011), available at http://www.fta.dot.gov/documents/Dear-
ColleagueLetter_-_CivilRights -. March_2011 .pdf (reminding grantees of Title VI re-
quirements and the FTA's implementing guidance).
134. See, e.g., FED. TRANSIT ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., REGION 10 BULLETIN No.
2010-62, TRANSIT SERVICE AND FARE EQUITY ANALYSIS WEBINAR (2010), available at
http://www.fta.dot.gov/documents/ScanBull10-62TransitServiceFareEquityAnalysisWebinar
08-12-10.pdf (inviting grantees to a webinar about how to perform impact assessments on
fare changes); NAT'L Coop. HIGHWAY RESEARCH PROGRAM, RESEARCH RESULTS DIGEST 340,
STATE DOT BEST PRACTICES FOR TITLE VI COMPLIANCE 10-11 (2009), available at
http://onlinepubx.trb.org/onlinepubs/nchrp/nchrp-rrd_340.pdf (providing examples of effec-
tive public outreach and participation efforts).
135. See Johnson, supra note 128, at 1384 & n.209 (providing examples of instances in
which the FTA conditioned funding on the grantees changing their programs or analyses).
136. See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 278-79 (2001) (describing initial claims
brought by plaintiffs).
137. See Notice of Proposed Title VI Circular, 71 Fed. Reg. 40,178, 40,179 (July 14,
2006) (predicting that Sandoval would likely increase the number of administrative com-
plaints, and that grant recipients would thus benefit from guidance specifying how they
could best avoid practices that have a disparate impact on minority communities).
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plaints, and advocacy helped make environmental justice and transportation ac-
cess salient civil rights issues. The executive order on environmental justice
emerged from litigation, administrative complaints, and other advocacy efforts
beginning in the 1980s to address claims of disparate environmental burdens
facing minority communities.138 Litigation and complaints pursued in the mid-
1990s, including cases like the MTA litigation, 139 harnessed Title VI to address
disparities in access to mass transit, elevating the question of transit access and
making plain the potential benefits of front-end planning and inclusion of mi-
nority groups. In strengthening its Title VI directives in transportation, the
DOT presented these directives as a response to complaints filed against transit
systems. 140
Additionally, in the late 1990s and 2000s community groups began to or-
ganize around the question of transportation equity, making Title VI a key
piece of their advocacy. The most prominent example is the Transportation Eq-
uity Network (TEN), a national coalition of more than 350 state and local faith-
based and community groups. 141 TEN's advocacy centers on improving fund-
ing and other resources for public transit, encouraging greater participation of
traditionally underserved community groups in transportation planning, and
creating environmentally sustainable and socially inclusionary transportation
policy. 42 Legal organizations like Public Advocates, a San Francisco Bay Area
nonprofit law firm, work with transportation-equity groups to file Title VI
138. See LUKE W. COLE & SHEILA R. FOSTER, FROM THE GROUND UP: ENVIRONMENTAL
RACISM AND THE RISE OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE MOVEMENT 54-55, app. (2001) (high-
lighting studies showing that race is a stronger predictor of the siting of environmental haz-
ards than income); U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, NOT IN My BACKYARD: EXECUTIVE
ORDER 12,898 AND TITLE VI AS TOOLS FOR ACHIEVING ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE 1-3, 13-16
(2003), available at http://www.usccr.gov/pubs/envjust/ej0104.pdf (discussing the origins of
the environmental justice movement, delineating problems regarding environmental justice,
and providing an overview of the goals of Executive Order 12,898); Dollie Burwell & Luke
W. Cole, Environmental Justice Comes Full Circle: Warren County Before and After, 1
GOLDEN GATE U. ENVTL. L.J. 9, 36-40 (2007) (detailing the development of the modern en-
vironmental justice movement).
139. See Labor/Cmty. Strategy Ctr. v. L.A. Cnty. Metro. Transp. Auth., 263 F.3d 1041
(9th Cir. 2001).
140. See Notice of Proposed Title VI Circular, 71 Fed. Reg. at 40,180 (providing exam-
ples of Title VI litigation and administrative complaints seeking increased transportation eq-
uity).
141. See Who We Are, TRANSP. EQUITY NETWORK, http://www.transportationequity.org/
what-we-do/who-we-are.html (last visited June 8, 2014).
142. See About Ten, TRANSP. EQUITY NETWORK, http://www.transportationequity.org/
what-we-do.html (last visited June 8, 2014); Platform: What We Want: The TEN Platform,
TRANSP. EQUITY NETWORK, http://www.transportationequity.org/what-we-do/back
ground.html (last visited June 8, 2014).
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complaints and to leverage those Title VI complaints to strengthen the regulato-
ry regime.143
In recent years, Public Advocates has filed a series of Title VI complaints
with the DOT seeking to promote access of minority communities to mass
transit services in California. Public Advocates assisted the Bus Riders Union
(the same group that was involved in the 1994 case against the MTA) in prepar-
ing a Title VI complaint in 2010 challenging the MTA's decision to substantial-
ly reduce bus service. 144 In response to the complaint, the FTA found that the
MTA was in violation of certain federal requirements obliging it to evaluate the
impact of transit expansion projects and ordered the agency to address dispari-
ties in the adoption of particular transportation policies. 145 In 2009, Public Ad-
vocates filed a Title VI complaint on behalf of several groups against the Bay
Area Rapid Transit District (BART), which operates rail service in the Bay Ar-
ea.146 BART sought to extend its rail system, deriving support in part from fed-
eral stimulus funds, and Public Advocates claimed that the proposed extension
failed to adequately service minority, transit-dependent populations in the East
Bay.147 Public Advocates successfully argued to the FTA that the system ex-
tension violated Title VI because BART had failed to do the required impact
assessments or consider alternatives.148 In the end, the DOT reallocated stimu-
lus funds away from this project. 149
The BART and Bus Riders Union complaints make use of the expanded
DOT Title VI guidance, and other advocates have built on the BART complaint
to strengthen the Title VI regime. In particular, after the success of the BART
143. See Staff Guillermo Mayer, PUB. ADvocs., http://www.publicadvocates.org/
guillermo-mayer-0 (last visited June 8, 2014) (describing affiliations with grassroots
transportation groups and TEN Network); USDOT Title VI Reform, PUB. ANDVOCS.,
http://www.publicadvocates.org/usdot-title-vi-reform (last visited June 8, 2014) (describing
Title VI advocacy efforts).
144. See Bus Riders Union Administrative Complaint, PUB. ADvocs.,
http://www.publicadvocates.org/bus-riders-union-administrative-complaint (last visited June
8, 2014).
145. Id.; see also THE DMP GRP., TITLE VI COMPLIANCE REVIEW OF THE Los ANGELES
COuNTY METROPOLITAN TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY (2011), available at
http://www.fta.dot.gov/documents/FinalLAMetroTitleVIReport_12_12_11.docx (present-
ing the findings of the final report prepared for the FTA).
146. See BART/Oakland Airport Connector (OAC), PUB. ADVOCs., http://www.public
advocates.org/bartoakland-airport-connector-oac#updates (last visited June 8, 2014).
147. See Johnson, supra note 128, at 1405 & nn.301-02, 1406 & n.303-06 (describing
Public Advocates' claim as well as BART's extension project, which it intended to fund with
$70 million in stimulus funds, DOT loans, and regional revenue).
148. See id. at 1406 (detailing the DOT's reallocation of stimulus funds in response to
the complaint).
149. See Letter from Peter Rogoff, Adm'r of Fed. Transit Admin., U.S. Dept. of
Transp., to Steve Heminger, Exec. Dir., Metro. Transp. Comm'n & Dorothy Dugger, Gen.
Manager, S.F. Bay Area Rapid Transit Dist. (Feb. 12, 2010), available at
http://www.urbanhabitat.org/files/Feb%2012%20BART%20MTC%20Letter_0.pdf.
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complaint, Public Advocates and other community groups formally urged the
FTA to strengthen its guidance for grantees' impact assessments, namely by
standardizing and tightening the metrics for assessing discriminatory im-
pacts.150 In response, the FTA issued a letter to all funding recipients empha-
sizing that grantees should heed the FTA's Title VI guidance to assess the im-
pact of service and fare changes.151 Then, in 2012-after allowing for public
comment by transit agencies and various groups-the FTA revised its Title VI
guidance circular.152 In key respects, the 2012 guidance strengthened the Title
VI requirements.
Advocates here played a role reminiscent of the one played by those in the
1960s who pressed for stronger rules in the area of school desegregation. Pri-
vate enforcers have used the administrative process to press for compliance
with agency rules, but also to expand the contours and meaning of these rules.
The claim here is not that these advocacy efforts are always successful-the
FTA did not adopt all the changes urged by Public Advocates and other trans-
portation-equity groups. Rather, the point is to understand that administrative
complaints to secure compliance and advocacy to expand the rules constitute
private enforcement of Title VI. This private enforcement is incident to mean-
ingful agency enforcement.
3. School discipline reform
Efforts to reform primary and secondary school discipline policies provide
another recent example of leveraging the advantages of the administrative
complaint process, in particular agency expertise and flexibility in crafting
remedies and publicizing solutions. In recent years, plaintiffs have filed admin-
istrative complaints against school districts claiming that certain school disci-
pline policies have an unjustified disparate impact on minority school children
150. See PUB. ADVOCATES, CIVIL RIGHTS AND ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE IN PUBLIC
TRANSPORTATION: PROPOSED FTA ACTIONS To BUILD ON ITS STRONG RECORD
OF ENFORCEMENT (2010), available at http://www.publicadvocates.org/sites/default/
files/library/white-paper-on-fta_titlevicircular withcoverletter_12-20-10.pdf (provid-
ing recommendations for strengthening the FTA's Title VI guidance). For more information
about the efforts of Public Advocates in the BART case, see generally GUILLERMO MAYER,
PUBLIC ADVOCATES, THE OAKLAND AIRPORT CONNECTOR: A CASE STUDY ON TITLE VI
ADMINISTRATIVE ENFORCEMENT (2010), available at http://www.transportationequity.org/
images/downloads/TENTitleVIWebinar_20100708 G.Mayer.pdf (detailing the advocacy
strategy of Public Advocates in the BART case).
151. See Letter from Peter Rogoff to Colleague, supra note 133.
152. See FED. TRANSIT ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP, CIRCULAR FTA C 4702.1B,
TITLE VI REQUIREMENTS AND GUIDELINES FOR FEDERAL TRANSIT ADMINISTRATION
RECIPIENTS (2012), available at http://www.fta.dot.gov/documents/FTATitleVI
FINAL.pdf.
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with the Department of Education's Office for Civil Rights (OCR).' 53 While
racial and ethnic disparities in the administration of school discipline have long
been a concern of civil rights groups, advocacy intensified in response to the
adoption by school districts in the 1990s of "zero tolerance" and other policies
that increased suspension and expulsion of minority youth and that made pun-
ishments for school rule infractions more severe. 154 Advocates have framed the
question as one of the "school-to-prison" pipeline, emphasizing the increasing
links between violations of school discipline policies and the criminalization of
minority youth.155
Private enforcement through the administrative process can promote exam-
ination of the potentially exclusionary impacts of these practices, and the possi-
bilities of alternatives that further safety and the rights of disciplined children.
Where it has found violations, OCR has worked with school districts to develop
remedies such as training for teachers in effective discipline methods, school
climate surveys, and the implementation of discipline review coordinator posi-
tions and systems for collecting and evaluating data on the effect of school dis-
cipline policies on particular groups.156 These are not classic forms of court-
ordered remedies such as damages or injunctive relief. These are remedies de-
veloped often in collaboration with school districts and other stakeholders,
which stem from a problem-solving approach-an attempt to develop remedies
that reflect the varied and often conflicting goals of participants.
Further, on January 8, 2014, the Department of Education took major ac-
tion in the area of school discipline when it issued guidance and a "Dear Col-
league Letter" to schools and administrators on federal standards and best prac-
153. See OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., TITLE VI ENFORCEMENT
HIGHLIGHTS 8 (2012), available at http://www2.ed.gov/documents/press-releases/title-vi-
enforcement.pdf (stating that from fiscal year 2009 to fiscal year 2011, the OCR received
almost 900 complaints about possible civil rights violations involving school discipline and
began 15 investigations); see also Jason Langberg, Title VI Complaints as a Tool in Disman-
tling the School-to-Prison Pipeline, JUv. JUST. & CHILD. RTs. (Juvenile Justice & Civil
Rights Section, N.C. Bar Ass'n, Cary, N.C.), June 2013, http://juvenilejusticeandchildrens
rights.ncbar.org/newsletters/jjcrjunel3/pipeline; Durham Public Schools Punish Black Stu-
dents and Students with Disabilities at Higher Rates than Peers, LEGAL AID N.C. (Apr. 16,
2013), http://www.legalaidnc.org/public/learn/media.releases/2013/durham-public-schools-
punish-black-students-disabled-students-at-higher-rates-than-peers.aspx (announcing the fil-
ing of a complaint filed with the OCR).
154. See, e.g., ADVANCEMENT PROJECT & THE CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT AT HARVARD
UNIV., OPPORTUNITIES SUSPENDED: THE DEVASTATING CONSEQUENCES OF ZERO TOLERANCE
AND SCHOOL DISCIPLINE (2000), available at http://civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/k-12-
education/school-discipline/opportunities-suspended-the-devastating-consequences-of-zero-
tolerance-and-school-discipline-policies/crp-opportunities-suspended-zero-tolerance-
2000.pdf, CATHERINE Y. KIM ET AL., THE SCHOOL-TO-PRISON PIPELINE: STRUCTURING LEGAL
REFORM 79-80 (2010).
155. See KIM ET AL., supra note 154.
156. See OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., supra note 153, at 9-10 (de-
tailing remedies that have been developed in conjunction with school districts).
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tices in school discipline.157 The guidance letter provides information on the
type of discipline that violates Title VI, and on effective programs for remedy-
ing and avoiding discriminatory discipline policies.158
Similar stories can be found in other substantive areas. For instance, the
Department of Agriculture has promulgated rules requiring that federal agen-
cies and grantees administering programs related to food, nutrition, forestry,
and agriculture conduct a "civil rights impact analysis" to ensure that minorities
and people with disabilities fairly benefit from federally funded programs.159
This regime of affirmative impact assessments is less vigorous and extensive
than the ones that exist in the context of transportation and education. These
agriculture rules are notable here, however, because their emergence can also
be explained by private enforcement activity that brought attention to inequities
and discrimination in the administration of agriculture programs. In particular,
civil rights groups pursued litigation and administrative complaints in the 1980s
challenging longstanding Department of Agriculture funding practices that ex-
cluded black farmers, and that led to the destruction of many black farms in the
South.160 Affirmative impact assessments have emerged as a regulatory re-
sponse to prevent similar forms of discrimination going forward.
B. Oversight
Leveraging the administrative complaint process and advocating for broad-
er rules and guidance have been crucial dimensions of Title VI enforcement.
Private actors also implement Title VI when they oversee how agencies enforce
and fail to enforce Title VI. The ultimate resolution of the Adams litigation lim-
its how private groups can turn to courts for oversight of agencies, but other
routes remain open for private groups to engage in agency oversight. As in any
administrative enforcement regime, the political process functions as a form of
oversight. Congress conducts hearings on Title VI-both to enhance enforce-
ment and to reign in enforcement. 161 Private groups are participants in this pro-
cess.
157. See Letter from Catherine E. Lhamon, Assistant Sec'y for Office of Civil Rights,
U.S. Dep't of Educ. & Jocelyn Samuels, Acting Assistant Att'y Gen., Office of Civil Rights,
U.S. Dep't of Educ., to Colleague (Jan. 8, 2014), available at http://www2.ed.gov/about/
offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-201401 -title-vi.pdf.
158. Id.
159. See OASCR Directive 4300-4, Civil Rights Impact Analysis 1 (U.S.D.A. 2003)
(summarizing the purpose of a civil rights impact analysis).
160. See TADLOCK COWAN & JODY FEDER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS20430, THE
PIGFORD CASES: USDA SETTLEMENT OF DISCRIMINATION SUITS BY BLACK FARMERS 2-9
(2013), available at http://new.nationalaglawcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/assets/crs/
RS20430.pdf (providing a summary of the litigation and judicial relief).
161. See, e.g., Oversight Hearing: Office for Civil Rights, Department of Education:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Labor & Human Res., 102d Cong. (1991).
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Beyond congressional oversight, the United States Commission on Civil
Rights has also played a central oversight role with regard to Title VI. Created
prior to the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the bipartisan Commission
is composed of six members appointed by the President and is charged with
overseeing the laws and policies of the United States with respect to civil
rights.162 The Commission has been plagued by political and ideological strug-
gles over its membership and role in more recent years.163 Yet at the inception
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Commission crucially helped train federal,
state, and local agencies on Title VI compliance,164 and over the past several
decades it has issued reports and data on the efficacy of the federal govern-
ment's Title VI enforcement activities. 165 At important junctures, the Commis-
sion has highlighted federal agencies' laggard enforcement of Title VI, for in-
stance faulting HEW in the mid-1960s for dispensing federal funds to school
districts that had failed to make meaningful progress towards desegregation.166
The Commission often consists of members of the civil rights community and
is staffed by lawyers and advocates with expertise in civil rights law and en-
forcement. 16 7 The Commission's capacity to hold hearings and conduct
factfinding investigations has made it a central conduit for nongovernmental
actors to participate in the process of evaluating the efficacy of Title VI en-
162. See Civil Rights Act of 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-315, §§ 101, 104, 71 Stat. 634, 634-
35 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1975-1975a).
163. See, e.g., Katherine Q. Seelye, Dispute Erupts over Seat on Civil Rights Panel,
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 5, 2001), http://www.nytimes.com/2001/12/06/us/dispute-erupts-over-seat-
on-civil-rights-panel.html (discussing the controversy over whether President Bush was enti-
tled to appoint a candidate to the Commission); Katherine Q. Seelye, Divided Civil Rights
Panel Approves Election Report, N.Y. TIMES (June 9, 2001), http://www.nytimes.com/2001/
06/09/us/divided-civil-rights-panel-approves-election-report.html (reporting disagreement
within the Commission regarding whether to release a report on voting irregularities in Flor-
ida during the 2000 presidential election).
164. See, e.g., U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, COMPLIANCE OFFICER'S MANUAL: A
HANDBOOK OF COMPLIANCE PROCEDURES UNDER TITLE VI OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964
(1966).
165. See, e.g., U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, TITLE VI .. . ONE YEAR AFTER: A
SURVEY OF DESEGREGATION OF HEALTH AND WELFARE SERVICES IN THE SOUTH (1966); U.S.
COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, CIVIL RIGHTS UNDER FEDERAL PROGRAMS: AN ANALYSIS OF TITLE
VI OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 (1968); U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, FEDERAL CIVIL
RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT EFFORT (1970); 1 U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTs, TEN-YEAR CHECK-
UP: HAVE FEDERAL AGENCIES RESPONDED TO CIVIL RIGHTS RECOMMENDATIONS? (2002)
[hereinafter U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, TEN-YEAR CHECK-UP], available at
http://www.usccr.gov/pubs/10yr02/voll/voll.pdf.
166. See U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, SURVEY OF SCHOOL DESEGREGATION IN THE
SOUTHERN AND BORDER STATES 1965-66, at 52 (1966) (finding that HEW's Office of Educa-
tion had accepted as proof of compliance mandatory court orders with standards "far below
[those] required by that Office for school districts desegregating under voluntary plans").
167. See Commissioners, U.S. COMMISSION ON CIV. RTS., http://www.usccr.gov/about/
commissioners.php (last visited June 8, 2014) (providing biographical information of current
commissioners).
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forcement by federal agencies.168 More recently, the Commission has conduct-
ed hearings and issued reports on how federal agencies can use Title VI to ad-
vance inclusion in the context of environmental justicel 69 and reviewed the
work of each federal agency charged with civil rights enforcement. 170
The role of private lawyers in agency oversight and implementation is now
understood as the classic work of Washington lawyers. But this work rarely
produces cases that feature in legal casebooks, nor does it lend itself to stirring
enforcement narratives. The late civil rights advocate William Taylor described
the emergence of this type of work after passage of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 and other civil rights statutes in the mid-1960s.171 As it became clear to
Taylor that civil rights statutes engendered civil rights responsibilities for all
agencies, he perceived the need for a private oup that would "ride herd on
federal agencies to see that they did their jobs." 72 Taylor's experience with the
Commission had persuaded him that agencies would not enforce these laws in
the absence of outside monitoring and pressure from civil rights groups."' This
administrative advocacy was pursued by groups in other areas such as consum-
er protection, but according to Taylor no civil rights group consistently per-
formed that role. 174 Accordingly, Taylor set up the Center for National Policy
Review in 1970 (which operated until 1986), which was charged with assisting
168. As an example, the former Staff Director of the Commission has described the
work of the Commission in the 1960s to press HEW to reject "freedom-of-choice" plans of-
fered by Southern school districts. See WILLIAM L. TAYLOR, THE PASSION OF MY TIMES: AN
ADVOCATE'S FIFTY-YEAR JOURNEY IN THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 85-86 (2004). William
Taylor also detailed the Commission's investigation into the federal government's farm pro-
gram, which was operated by private parties at the state and local level in a discriminatory
fashion. See id at 87. The Commission urged the President and the Department of Agricul-
ture to address the discrimination. Id. Though Taylor admitted the problem was not fully re-
solved by this action, this investigation served as a predecessor to the 1990s lawsuit on dis-
crimination within the Department of Agriculture's farm program. Id.
169. See U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 138 (examining the implementation
of Executive Order 12,898 by four federal agencies).
170. 3 U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, TEN-YEAR CHECK-UP, supra note 165 (2003)
(analyzing the extent to which the civil rights programs in the Department of Agriculture, the
Department of the Interior, the Environmental Protection Agency, and the Small Business
Administration have implemented the Commission's recommendations on the enforcement
of civil rights statutes offered in previous reports), available at http://www.usccr.gov/pubs/
l0yr03/10yr03.pdf; 4 id. (2004) (providing a similar analysis of the efforts of the Depart-
ment of Education, the Department of Health and Human Services, the Department of Hous-
ing and Urban Development, and the EEOC), available at http://www.usccr.gov/pubs/
1 OyrO4/1 OyrO4.pdf.
171. See TAYLOR, supra note 168, at 102-04 (describing the creation of the Center for
National Policy Review).
172. Id. at 102.
173. See id.
174. See id. at 102-03 (stating that "five years after enactment of the laws, no one had
yet grasped this mantle," and that this type of administrative advocacy was similar to the
work of Ralph Nader in the auto safety and consumer protection fields).
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other groups in petitioning for rulemaking, commenting on regulations, and fil-
ing administrative complaints.175
Political scientist Stephen Halpern has described LDF's increased engage-
ment in administrative oversight beginning in the 1970s as the result of the
group's initial success in the Adams litigation.176 That litigation required OCR
to interact with LDF and other civil rights groups, leading LDF to play a key
role in the development and enforcement of Title VI in the area of higher edu-
cation during the 1970s. As detailed by Halpern, this work gave civil rights
groups access to information about how OCR worked, insights into the en-
forcement process, and rendered them "well-informed critics who could use the
information they received to enhance their bargaining power."1 77
This type of administrative oversight is now a standard part of the arsenal
of civil rights groups in Washington, D.C. Most major civil rights organizations
have an advocacy presence in Washington,17 8 much of it geared toward admin-
istrative enforcement and implementation. The Leadership Conference on Civil
Rights and Human Rights, a coalition of more than 175 civil rights groups,179
actively monitors and reports on administrative enforcement of civil rights in-
cluding with regard to Title VI.1 80
This is not a claim about the sufficiency of the current work; as I suggest in
Part III, this work might be expanded in critical ways to focus on proactive
front-end enforcement and implementation of Title VI at the state and local
175. See id. at 103 (stating that the group "would also seek publicity for continuing
problems of discrimination and perhaps file lawsuits to get federal agencies to do their
jobs").
176. See HALPERN, supra note 23, at 293 ("[B]ecause of Adams, OCR had to deal with
civil rights groups in a much different way than in the 1960s.").
177. Id.
178. See, e.g., National Public Policy Office (Washington, D.C.), MALDEF,
http://www.maldef.org/aboutloffices/washington-dc/index.html (last visited June 8, 2014);
Washington, D.C. Advocacy, NAACP LDF, http://www.naacpldf.org/category/washington-
dc-advocacy (last visited June 8, 2014).
179. See About The Leadership Conference on Civil and Human Rights & The Leader-
ship Conference Education Fund, LEADERSHIP CONF., http://www.civilrights.org/about (last
visited June 8, 2014). The Leadership Conference on Civil and Human Rights was estab-
lished in 1950 (originally known as the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights). History of
The Leadership Conference on Civil and Human Rights & The Leadership Conference Edu-
cation Fund, LEADERSHIP CONF., http://www.civilrights.org/about/history.html (last visited
June 8, 2014). Taylor notes that by 1986, the groups that comprised the Leadership Confer-
ence had begun to take up much of the administrative advocacy work previously done by the
Center for National Policy Review. See TAYLOR, supra note 168, at 130.
180. See, e.g., THE LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE EDUC. FUND, THE LEADERSHIP
CONFERENCE ON CIVIL RIGHTS, STILL SEGREGATED: How RACE AND POVERTY STYMIE THE
RIGHT TO EDUCATION 13 (2013), available at http://civilrightsdocs.info/pdf/reports/
StillSegregated-Shadow Report.pdf; Department ofEducation Fails to Enforce Desegrega-
tion of Higher Education, 2 Civ. RTs. MONITOR, June-July 1987, http://www.civilrights.org/
monitor/junejulyl 987/art3pl.html.
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levels. The point is to include administrative advocacy and oversight in the
meaning of Title VI enforcement.
C. Mobilization
Beyond shaping rules and guidance and overseeing compliance and agency
enforcement activities, private advocates leverage Title VI's regulatory regime
as part of a broader set of problem-solving strategies. Recent examples of Title
VI as a leverage point for mobilization can be found in the context of educa-
tion.
As introduced above, civil rights advocates have sought to mobilize public
policy attention on the question of harsh and discriminatory discipline policies.
Title VI is only one piece of a larger advocacy strategy aimed at documenting
the effect of school discipline policies on educational achievement and the
criminalization of youth, highlighting racial disparities, developing legal and
policy remedies, and encouraging alternatives. The consistent attention that
advocates have brought to the question of zero tolerance has helped define the
policy issue; outside groups have functioned as policy entrepreneurs helping to
map the problem and direct attention to the issue. 182 In 2010, the Department of
Education pledged to reinvigorate its civil rights enforcement, including
strengthening its focus on racial disparities stemming from school discipline
policies.183 In 2012, the agency significantly expanded its data collection ef-
181. See ADVANCEMENT PROJECT & THE CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT AT HARVARD UNIV., su-
pra note 154, at 31-39 (highlighting school systems with discipline policies that "reach out"
instead of "push out"); KIM ET AL., supra note 154, at 23, 27-28, 56-64, 83-84, 91-95, 114-22
(outlining a range of legal strategies based on the Equal Protection Clause, First Amend-
ment, Fourth Amendment, Due Process Clause, and federal and state disability laws);
DANIEL J. LOSEN & TIA ELENA MARTINEZ, CTR. FOR CIVIL RIGHTS REMEDIES, CIVIL RIGHTS
PROJECT AT UCLA, OUT OF SCHOOL & OFF TRACK: THE OVERUSE OF SUSPENSIONS IN
AMERICAN MIDDLE AND HIGH SCHOOLS (2013), available at http://civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/
resources/projects/center-for-civil-rights-remedies/school-to-prison-folder/federal-reports/
out-of-school-and-off-track-the-overuse-of-suspensions-in-american-middle-and-high-
schools/OutofSchool-OffTrackUCLA4-8.pdf; Matt Cregor & Damon Hewitt, Dismantling
the School-to-Prison Pipeline: A Survey from the Field, POVERTY & RACE (Poverty & Race
Research Action Council, Wash., D.C.), Jan.-Feb. 2011, at 5, 6-7 (documenting reform ef-
forts that resulted from community mobilization by parents and students); ENDING THE
SCHOOLHOUSE TO JAILHOUSE TRACK, http://safequalityschools.org (last visited June 8, 2014)
(providing resources for parents, educators, students, law enforcement, and activists); Na-
tionwide Survey of State Education Agencies' Online School Discipline Data, Civ. RTs.
PROJECT AT UCLA (Sept. 12, 2013), http://civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/resources/projects/
center-for-civil-rights-remedies/school-to-prison-folder/online-data-resources/nation-wide-
survey-of-state-education-agencies2019-online-school-disciplinary-data.
182. See JOHN W. KINGDON, AGENDAS, ALTERNATIVES, AND PUBLIC POLICIES 45-70 (2d
ed. 2003) (examining the importance of participants outside government in shaping policy).
183. See Arne Duncan, Sec'y of Educ., Crossing the Next Bridge: Remarks on the 45th
Anniversary of "Bloody Sunday" at the Edmund Pettus Bridge, Selma, Alabama (Mar. 8,
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forts on school discipline (and other areas),1 84 which has since provided a basis
for broader advocacy strategies by groups-such as publicizing data on dispari-
ties, highlighting the variation among schools districts' discipline policies, and
suggesting effective alternatives. 185 As a result of investigations, complaints,
and policy advocacy, major school districts have begun to revise their discipli-
nary policies.186
The use of high-stakes educational tests in determining access to elite high
schools in New York City provides another example. In 2012, LDF, the Puerto
Rican Legal Defense Fund, and several other New York City-based groups
filed a Title VI complaint challenging the admissions process for New York
City's eight "Specialized High Schools," the most competitive and elite high
schools in the city.' 87 The New York City Department of Education determines
admission to these high schools through a student's "rank-order score" on a
single admissions test, without reference to grades, teacher recommendations,
or other factors. 188 The groups provided evidence that this admissions practice
has a statistically significant disparate impact on black and Latino appli-
cants. 189 Further, they claimed that the use of a test as the sole criterion for ad-
missions is not justified by educational necessity because testing experts dis-
courage the use of tests as the single criterion for making high-stakes decisions,
2010) (transcript available at http://www2.ed.gov/news/speeches/2010/03/03082010.htmi)
(pledging renewed commitment to civil rights enforcement).
184. See OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., THE TRANSFORMED CIVIL
RIGHTS DATA COLLECTION (CRDC) (2012), available at http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/
list/ocr/docs/crdc-2012-data-summary.pdf; Tamar Lewin, Black Students Face More Disci-
pline, Data Suggests, N.Y. TIMEs (Mar. 6, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/06/
education/black-students-face-more-harsh-discipline-data-shows.html (reporting on the
CRDC discipline data).
185. See, e.g., Nationwide Survey of State Education Agencies' Online School Disci-
pline Data, supra note 18 1.
186. See Lizette Alvarez, Seeing the Toll, Schools Revise Zero Tolerance, N.Y. TIMES
(Dec. 2, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/03/education/seeing-the-toll-schools-
revisit-zero-tolerance.html; School Discipline in Broward County, ADVANCEMENT PROJECT
(Oct. 8, 2013), http://www.advancementproject.org/blog/entry/school-discipline-in-broward-
county (describing the efforts of stakeholders from the school system, civil rights groups,
law enforcement, and juvenile justice judges to revise school discipline policies in Broward
County, Florida).
187. See Letter from Damon T. Hewitt, NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., et al.,
to N.Y. Office, Office for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep't of Educ. (Sept. 27, 2012),
available at http://www.naacpldf.org/files/case-issue/Specialized%20High%20Schools%20
Complaint.pdf.
188. Id. at 1.
189. See id. at 2 (showing that the impact is "particularly severe" at two of the most
elite Specialized High Schools-Stuyvesant and Bronx Science).
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and the admissions test has not been shown to be predictive of educational suc-
cess at the schools. 190
Significantly, however, the groups' strategy has extended beyond the filing
of the administrative complaint. At base, the case presents a challenge to in-
grained ideas about the meaning of merit, and how to determine access to a
seemingly scarce resource-an elite education. These questions are contested
as a matter of educational policy as well as normatively. Accordingly, the
groups' complaint was accompanied by public policy advocacy to publicize the
effect of the admissions practice, highlight racial and ethnic disparities, and
show possible alternatives that would promote access for underserved groups
while maintaining educational quality at the schools. 191 In October 2013, LDF
and a New York community group released a "policy blueprint" for the incom-
ing New York City mayor to advance effective alternatives for determining
admission to the specialized high schools. 192
As of this writing it is unclear whether the groups' Title VI complaint will
be successful or whether the New York City Department of Education will
adopt a different admissions strategy. Still, the case provides an example of us-
ing Title VI as a component of a larger policy advocacy strategy to marshal
public attention on an issue and pursue policy as well as legal advocacy.
190. See id. at 1 ("[The New York City Department of Education] has never shown that
this practice (or the test itself) validly and reliably predicts successful participation in the
programs offered by the Specialized High Schools.").
191. Key groups including teachers' unions came out in favor of the complaint. See
Resolution on Specialized High School Admission Policies, UNITED FED'N TCHRS. (Dec. 12,
2012), http://www.uft.org/union-resolutions/resolution-specialized-high-school-admission-
policies. The issue has been extensively covered in the local press, though not all accounts
are favorable of course. See, e.g., Al Baker, Charges of Bias in Admission Test Policy at
Eight Elite Public High Schools, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 27, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/
2012/09/28/nyregion/specialized-high-school-admissions-test-is-racially-discriminatory-
complaint-says.html; Juan Gonzalez, New York City Specialized High Schools Admission
Test a Tool for Affluent Residents to Buy Their Children's Way into Elite Public Schools,
N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Sept. 27, 2012, 11:39 PM), http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/
education/new-york-city-specialized-high-schools-admission-test-tool-affluent-residents-
buy-children-elite-public-schools-article-1.1170080; Stephon Johnson, New Report Chal-
lenges Merit of Single-Test Admission for Specialized High Schools, N.Y. AMSTERDAM
NEWS (Oct. 31, 2013, 1:15 PM), http://amsterdamnews.com/news/2013/oct/31/new-report-
challenges-merit-single-test-admission-; see also Philissa Cramer, Complaint Targets Elite
HS Admissions Process, Not Just Outcome, CHALKBEAT (Sept. 27, 2012),
http://gothamschools.org/2012/09/27/complaint-targets-elite-hs-admissions-process-not-just-
outcome.
192. See CMTY. SERV. Soc'Y OF N.Y. & NAACP LEGAL DEF. & EDUC. FUND, INC., THE
MEANING OF MERIT: ALTERNATIVES FOR DETERMINING ADMISSION TO NEW YORK CITY'S
SPECIALIZED HIGH SCHOOLS (2013), available at http://b.3cdn.net/nycss/b72f6ba9554188f8
41_d3m6bzkxa.pdf.
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D. Possibilities
It is tempting to understand this type of administrative advocacy only as a
second-best option to court enforcement, a sad necessity given that Sandoval
makes private court action impossible. The disadvantages of the administrative
process are well understood, including potential problems of bureaucratic tor-
por, politics, and even capture. Yet administrative action has virtues of its own,
and even potential advantages over court enforcement. In the context of civil
rights enforcement generally, administrative actions can be cheaper than private
litigation, particularly when one seeks to reform institutional structures. In an
administrative complaint, the resources, costs, and expertise necessary to inves-
tigate and analyze complex questions of discrimination and disparate impact
might be shared with the agency. An agency also might have institutional ad-
vantages over courts in the finding of a violation and the construction of the
remedy. Agencies may be able to bring their underlying expertise about a par-
ticular substantive area to bear in determining what types of actions violate Ti-
tle VI and its guidelines and regulations and in determining whether less dis-
criminatory alternatives are available that further program goals. While courts
may be less willing to order remedies that require supervision or intrusion into
state and local practices, 193 a federal agency's funding and regulatory relation-
ship with the relevant state or transit agency provides a potential opening for
enforcement of remedies.
This dynamic may have played a role in the BART complaint before the
FTA. While Title VI litigation has influenced the development of Title VI
rules, the MTA mass transit litigation was one of the few cases actually won by
plaintiffs in court. Courts might be less willing to find violations or order reme-
dies that require altering the funding structure or design of a large transit insti-
tution. Yet the FTA's ongoing funding relationship with mass transit grantees
and its ability to negotiate remedies with grantees that do not require individual
damages or funding termination provide a structure for shaping remedies and
pressing grantees to develop alternatives.194 For this reason, private enforce-
193. Judicial reluctance to second-guess the practices of state and local governments is
apparent in key lower court decisions rejecting Title VI disparate impact claims. See, e.g., GI
Forum v. Tex. Educ. Agency, 87 F. Supp. 2d 667, 668 (W.D. Tex. 2000) ("It is clear that the
law requires courts to give deference to state legislative policy; in the educational context,
such deference is even more warranted. Education is the particular responsibility of state
governments." (citations omitted)).
194. Termination of funds is rare in Title VI's enforcement regime. The statute empha-
sizes that suspension or termination is a last resort when voluntary compliance efforts are
unsuccessful. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (2012) (requiring that the termination of or refusal to
grant assistance be undertaken only where "compliance cannot be secured by voluntary
means"). This may seem a limitation in some respects if recipients do not view termination
of funds as a credible remedy, but Title VI's conditions on spending rely on a range of fund-
ing compliance methods, including negotiations to secure compliance, voluntary compliance
through agreements in the pre-award stage, and deferral of funding decisions pending com-
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ment through the administrative process may yield benefits unavailable in court
litigation.
Moreover, as shown by the examples above, the complaint process can
force attention on civil rights problems like harmful disciplinary policies, pro-
duce knowledge about potential remedies and alternatives, and provide civil
rights groups access and credibility with regulators. Crucially, this process en-
larges the rules that govern grantees, allowing enforcement of statutory goals
without depending simply on filing administrative complaints. What can
emerge from this process is a set of rules that govern grantees at the time they
receive federal funds, before a complaint is filed. Through this process, the
very rules that constitute Title VI are shaped-the meaning of "discrimination"
is elaborated. In this way, the work presents a marked contrast to the con-
strained model of rights elaboration in Bakke.
To be sure, attempts by civil rights groups to strengthen Title VI's regula-
tory regime do not always produce the desired results. My suggestion is not that
the strength of group advocacy efforts explains variations in lack of agency en-
forcement. Despite heavy investments in Title VI advocacy, environmental jus-
tice advocates have struggled to get the EPA to strengthen its enforcement. The
agency has been plagued by backlogs in processing complaints, 195 and accord-
ing to a recent account, the EPA's Office of Civil Rights has failed to make a
single final finding of noncompliance among the 247 complaints advocates
196have filed since 1993. The case of environmental justice reminds us that the
success and failure of Title VI advocacy depends on a range of factors which
attend the agency context including conflicting regulatory goals, competing in-
terest groups, the political and public salience of the issue, and the expertise,
vigor, and inclinations of the agency and its administrators to advance particu-
lar regulatory goals. 197
pliance negotiation. See CIVIL RIGHTS Div., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, TITLE VI LEGAL MANUAL
85-90 (2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/cor/coord/vimanual.pdf (detail-
ing the methods available to agencies to secure compliance).
195. See U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 138, at 55-62 (describing the
EPA's severe problems in investigating and resolving complaints).
196. See Tony LoPresti, Realizing the Promise of Environmental Civil Rights: The Re-
newed Effort to Enforce Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 65 ADMIN. L. REv. 757, 760-
61(2013).
197. For instance, the EPA's enforcement struggles can be explained by competing reg-
ulatory goals and the often-conflicting interests asserted by industry, state and local govern-
ments, environmental groups, and community groups. See, e.g., DELOITTE CONSULTING LLP,
EVALUATION OF THE EPA OFFICE OF CIVIL RIGHTS 25-28 (2011), available at
http://www.epa.gov/epahome/pdf/epa-ocr_20110321-finalreport.pdf (finding in a report
commissioned by the EPA that Office of Civil Rights staff lacked expertise to undertake Ti-
tle VI investigations and that the Office of Civil Rights was not made a priority within the
agency); LoPresti, supra note 196, at 776-79 (detailing opposition by state and local gov-
ernment officials and industry groups when the EPA sought to investigate Title VI environ-
mental justice claims in Louisiana and Michigan).
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Yet to acknowledge these real challenges of Title VI's regulatory regime
should not lead one to ignore those important instances where legal advocates'
implementation efforts have yielded more fruit.
III. NAMING TITLE VI's FUTURE
These accounts reveal that Title VI must be understood within a lawyering
and advocacy framework broader than court enforcement. Delineating Title
VI's force, that is, determining whether it is a "giant" that is sleeping or one
that is awake, must be considered with reference to the full range of strategies
employed by private actors in elaborating the statute's scope. This regulatory
dimension of private implementation is of course present in every civil rights
statute. It is the dimension that moves beyond not only litigation but beyond the
filing of administrative complaints to help shape rulemaking, guidance, and
other determinants of agency implementation. In the context of Title VII for
instance, the EEOC, though lacking substantive rulemaking power, has the
power to issue key guidancel 98 and collect data.' 99 Private actors have played a
key part in shaping the EEOC's implementation efforts in this domain. But Ti-
tle VI's enforcement by agencies with substantive rulemaking power, its reach
across many federal agencies, and its substantive scope and coverage as well as
the limited domain of courts in elaborating its norms, make understanding these
more expansive forms of Title VI implementation crucial.
In highlighting this work, I want to acknowledge that the forms of statutory
implementation and elaboration by private actors described in Part II are in
many senses still in need of a name. Little has been written by scholars or ad-
vocates about this type of lawyering practice. It is not entirely clear that civil
rights lawyers reflect on or name the advocacy performed at the federal, state,
and local levels to implement Title VI as a distinct form of advocacy. The ad-
ministrative lawyering described in Part II might thus simply be an ad hoc re-
sponse by lawyers, determining what works to solve a particular problem and
exploiting openings where they might be found. The efficacy of this type of
lawyering cannot easily be measured.
198. For an early example of influential EEOC guidelines, see Guidelines on Employee
Selection Procedures, 35 Fed. Reg. 12,333 (Aug. 1, 1970) (codified as amended at 29 C.F.R.
§§ 1607.1-.14 (2013)) (providing rules for avoiding racially disparate impacts in selection
practices). For a more recent example, see EEOC, ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE No. 915.002,
CONSIDERATION OF ARREST AND CONVICTION RECORDS IN EMPLOYMENT DECISIONS UNDER
TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 (2012), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/
laws/guidance/arrestconviction.cfm (providing guidance on how employers might avoid
disparate impact discrimination in the consideration of arrest and conviction records in em-
ployment decisions).
199. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8(c); 29 C.F.R. §§ 1602.7-.14. The EEOC has developed
what is now known as the "Employer Information Report EEO- 1," or just the EEO-1 Report,
which requires certain employers to collect and report data on their employees' race, ethnici-
ty, and sex. See id. § 1602.7 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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At the same time, commentators have recognized in other contexts the role
of private nongovernmental attorneys in agency implementation. Sophia Lee
has detailed the role of civil rights groups in pressing the FCC to require broad-
casters and common carriers to implement equal employment policies.200 Wil-
liam Eskridge and John Ferejohn have highlighted the role of civil rights law-
yers in shaping the administrative rules that govern Title VII in the area of
pregnancy discrimination. 201 Robert Lieberman has recognized in the context
of Title VII that private lawyers engaged their "private power" to ress agen-
cies outside the context of private court enforcement in the 1970s. 21 As in the
account of Title VI that I offered in Part II, Lieberman shows how civil rights
lawyers harnessed data provided by the EEOC, publicized agency investiga-
tions, and worked with administrators to target discriminatory employers and
industries. 203 The work of lawyers to implement Title VI, like the above ac-
counts of administrative lawyering, shows how agencies' administrative en-
forcement depends on private advocacy. This account also has important impli-
cations for lawyering practice, showing that "enforcement" of Title VI means
not just promoting compliance by grantees with preset rules, but engaging in an
iterative process with agencies to expand and shape the very meaning of these
rules.
Highlighting this lawyering has significance not just for describing the cur-
rent and past work of nongovernmental lawyers and advocates, but also for re-
flecting on the gaps in this process of private implementation and on the strate-
gies needed to advance this work. The administrative lawyering described by
Lee and Eskridge and Ferejohn in other regulatory contexts tends to be under-
taken by groups centered in Washington, D.C., which emphasize the implemen-
tation of statutes at the federal level. A Washington focus is evident too in ad-
ministrative lawyering under Title VI as exemplified by early organizations like
the Center for National Policy Review, which launched administrative lawyer-
ing under Title VI with the goal of overseeing federal agency implementation
of Title VI.204
Title VI's future depends on devolving this type of advocacy. Title VI's
rules extend to grantees at the state and local levels, 205 and advocates should
200. See Sophia Z. Lee, Race, Sex and Rulemaking: Administrative Constitutionalism
and the Workplace, 1960 to the Present, 96 VA. L. REV. 799, 821-23 (2010).
201. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR. & JOHN FEREJOHN, A REPUBLIC OF STATUTES: THE
NEW AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 31 (2010).
202. Robert C. Lieberman, Private Power and American Bureaucracy: The EEOC and
Civil Rights Enforcement 2-3 (Mar. 18, 2005) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://webl.millercenter.org/apd/colloquia/pdf/col_2005_0318_lieberman.pdf; see also JOHN
DAVID SKRENTNY, THE IRONIES OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: POLITICS, CULTURE, AND JUSTICE IN
AMERICA 125-27 (1996).
203. See Lieberman, supra note 202, at 22-23.
204. See supra notes 171-75 and accompanying text.
205. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-4a (2012).
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also engage in activity to monitor, shape, and guide implementation beyond the
federal level. Now that the Department of Education requires state and local
education departments and districts to develop new discipline practices and col-
lect data, and the Department of Transportation requires grantees to conduct
impact assessments and adopt alternatives, effective implementation means ad-
vocates and lawyers should be poised to participate in planning, evaluating da-
ta, comparing practices of state and local grantees, highlighting effective re-
forms, and decrying shortcomings. Indeed, devolving advocacy and oversight is
particularly crucial given the success that advocates have had in expanding Ti-
tle VI's domain.
CONCLUSION
To understand all the ways lawyers implement Title VI, one must resort to
sometimes-vague phrases: multipronged lawyering, problem-solving advocacy,
and administrative lawyering. This is the lawyering through which groups pri-
vately implement Title VI's antidiscrimination norm and at the same time
shape the reach and meaning of that norm. In this Essay, I have suggested that
this type of lawyering is a crucial way in which private groups implement Title
VI's expansive goals of affirmative inclusion beyond the constrained interpre-
tation of Bakke. It is how Title VI is monitored and implemented beyond the
formal strictures of the Adams litigation and Sandoval.
Full realization of Title VI's regime depends on lawyers and other groups
filing lawsuits and complaints, engaging in rulemaking and lobbying, conduct-
ing policy reviews, analyzing data, and participating in planning and design.
Much of this work is not conventionally recognized as lawyering. In fact, there
may be no such thing as a Title VI lawyer. Rather there are lawyers and advo-
cates using Title VI as one tool among many to gain traction and find legal and
policy solutions to particular problems. Given constraints on court enforcement
and the complexity of civil rights problems today, finding a way to name and
understand this work, and to highlight this advocacy in casebooks, might be
critical not only for Title VI's future, but for the future of civil rights lawyering.
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